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The international tax law is a creature of domestic provisions and a series of bilateral or 
multilateral tax treaties between sovereign countries. International agreements are particular 
important in corporate taxation as they regulate the power to tax of source and residence 
countries avoiding international double taxation. 
The taxation system we are working with today and the traditional permanent establishment 
(PE) definition largely ran off notions invented in 1920s. At that time generally enterprises were 
making money in a given jurisdiction thanks to a fix place of business with real assets and 
people operating from there. 
And still today there are two general limitations on source taxation of business profits. On one 
hand, states can tax non-resident companies only if the company has a PE on their territory and 
on the other, if a non-resident has a PE in a source state, that state can tax only the income 
attributable to that PE. The source state consider the PE as an independent legal entity 
calculating an “arm’s length” income through the use of widely adopted transfer pricing 
guidelines. 
Nonetheless, the most successful current digitalised business models rely on: scale without 
mass, intangibles, data and user participation trough social networks, collaborative 
consumption, e-commerce and cloud. All these new sources of value creation are dramatically 
mining the global tax system equilibrium. 
Additionally lack of coordination and non-transparency in national legal regimes led to gaps 
and tax competition between states. This environment provided unique opportunities for 
multinationals to implement aggressive tax planning and profit shifting among jurisdictions.  
Although governments were aware of these unresolved issues they did not undertake 
fundamental reform of the taxation of multinationals. For example, European countries 
welcomed for several years investments, productive factors and jobs, tolerating a certain 
amount of income erosion. 
At the same time these dynamics made U.S. companies more competitive and U.S. shareholders 
richer. Consequently no stakeholder was complaining about tax avoidance. 
After the 2008 crisis, countries started addressing tax planning problems because they were 
facing budgetary shortfalls. Politicians could no longer take this indulgent attitude towards 




pretend corporations to pay their fair share of tax within countries where they were creating 
value and profit. 
The ongoing Covid-19 crisis has increased these feelings even more. Companies like Amazon, 
Netflix and Zoom are stronger and profitable than ever while countries are facing difficulties in 
improving their healthcare systems and social protection. 
Today the debate has reached an acute phase around how to redefine the concept of taxable 
presence and how much corporate profit should be allocated to the market countries. 
This work critically analyses current proposals of international tax reform comparing two 
different approaches. 
On one hand, a multilateral approach which suggests to address modern tax challenges through 
a consensus based solution; on the other hand the unilateral approach based on independent 
initiatives carried on unilaterally by sovereign countries. 
In addition to the present introduction, this study is organized in three chapters and a conclusion 
as follows. 
The first chapter is about the dramatic transformation of the entire economy and society due 
to the digitalisation process. This last revolution had a huge impact also on the way of 
conducting business, on the labour market and regulations. 
It inevitably affected international taxation as well. This initial part of the thesis describes the 
characteristics of big tech companies and how internet and digitalization have changed their 
business models which less and less rely on permanent establishments. The notion of fixed 
place of business has moved away and the supply chain of multinationals has changed. As these 
digitalised multinationals can reach anyone with an internet connection anywhere on the planet, 
it’s getting harder for countries to track who is doing business with their citizens. 
Then, there is an overview of the main problematics related with the taxation of these groups 
whose smartest tax directors have shown a brilliant creativity in minimizing their tax bills 
around the world without violating the law of any state. 
The second chapter describes the role of supranational players as the OCED, the G20 and the 
European Commission in the debate for finding a comprehensive consensus based solution to 
tax the digital economy and to restructure international tax principles. 
A radical tax reform addressing the challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy is 




The first issue is the rise of digital technologies that are enabling several companies to reach 
cross borders customers without local employees offices or operations in market jurisdictions. 
Non-physical commercial arrangements are used by multinationals to blatantly avoid tax nexus 
in source states. This fact is creating some concerns about the adequacy of taxable physical 
presence and nexus rules. 
So far, policy responses to this have been: OECD’s Pillar One - Unified Approach, unilateral 
Digital Services Taxes (DSTs) and virtual permanent establishment rules. Italy as well, has 
implemented its own version of DST to extract some money from companies that are considered 
to be earning a conspicuous amount of money from Italian market but do not pay much taxes 
because of the outdated international tax system. 
The second critical problem is related to the growing importance of intangible assets, like 
software and patents, as significant value drivers in the worldwide economy. These intangible 
properties can be easily moved by one jurisdiction to another without sustaining troubles and 
costs typically associated with a factory relocation. Most of these assets are shifted to lower tax 
jurisdictions. This instead is rising discussions of minimum tax policies like OECD’s Pillar 
Two - GloBE Proposal and the U.S. GILTI. 
After a brief introduction of BEPS Project, Action 1 is articulated under the OECD Inclusive 
Framework proposals: the “Unified Approach” and the “GloBE Proposal”. There is also a 
critical analysis of these OECD guidelines, a study of profit reallocation mechanisms under 
Pillar One and a quantitative estimation of the combined effects of Pillar One and Two. 
Then, the European Commission Digital Services Tax (DST) proposal is illustrated since 
several member states, including Italy, have based their unilateral DST on it. 
The last part of this chapter focuses on explaining how the European digital tax could be 
challenged by the taxpayer with reference to possible EU law violations (nationality 
discrimination, fundamental freedoms principles, state aid doctrine). 
The third chapter presents Italy as one of the first European countries to think about taxing 
the digital economy with sector-specific tax and summarises the history of the Italian Web Tax. 
After, it is reported the implementation of the Italian DST in the Italian Budget Law for 2020 
and how much the Italian Government is expecting to rise in tax gain. 
Even on this proposal a critical analysis is available. It is useful to compare the Italian version 




Finally the Residual Profit Allocation by Income (RPA-I) is proposed as an interesting proposal 
that I consider of vital importance for the future reorganization of international taxation. 
The conclusion expresses the impossibility of ring-fencing the digital economy in the overall 
tax reform, clarifying how negative and dangerous would be the proliferation of unilateral 
measures targeting multinationals operating only in the digital sector. 
It also explores what seems to be the most probable scenario for 2021, underlying the taxpayers’ 







The digital transformation of the economy 
1.1 The digital market 
Twenty five years ago, the phenomenon of digitalization emerged on the scene causing a 
tremendous transformation of the existing industries, changing the nature of innovation, of 
product development and of our interactions. This process revolutionized the structure and the 
organization of our lives, giving a new order to the economy and the society. 
Connectivity, “smart” digital services, Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) 
are profoundly influencing human relationships and markets. One of the most disruptive 
changes regards the players’ capacity to move easily across sector and industry borders. 
Increasingly, industries are blurring their boundaries and they are integrating different attributes 
to create new disruptive business models. Researches “show that an emerging set of digital 
ecosystems could account for more than $60 trillion in revenue by 2025, or more than 30% of 
global corporate revenue”.1 
Digitalization is registering a strong growth (15-25% per year) especially in the global South 
of the world. Roughly speaking, the digital economy is making up around 5% of global GDP 
and 3% of global employment.2 
According to the International Monetary Fund the Digital Economy can be considered, in a 
broad sense, as the entire set of activities based on digitalised data and online platforms.3 The 
economy is going digital through the widespread diffusion of information technologies. Today 
in fact we are surely used to talk about the “digitalised economy” when we are referring to the 
widest definition of the economy. (see Figure 1, “Defining, Conceptualising and Measuring the 
Digital Economy”4). 
            
1 Hirt Martin, If You’re Not Building an Ecosystem, Chances Are Your Competitors Are, McKinsey & Company, 
12 June 2018. In this article the author is describing the fast growing and the complexity of digitalised ecosystem 
and he underlines how much is important management’s intuitiveness. 
2 World Economic Forum, Expanding Participation and Boosting Growth: The Infrastructure Needs of the Digital 
Economy, March 2015. 
3 International Monetary Fund, Measuring the Digital Economy, Staff Report, February 28, 2018. 
4 Manchester Centre for Development Informatics, Defining, Conceptualising and Measuring the Digital 




Online networks, smart phones, sensors are producing massive volumes of data supported by 
surprisal storage capacity, algorithms and stronger computing power. Traditional sectors, like 
manufacturing and car industry, are being transformed and digitalized through innovations. 
There are plenty of opportunities offered by the digitalised economy and as a consequence 
relevant challenges need to be addressed. 
For example, digitalization has a positive impact on companies in term of efficiency, cost and 
time savings in their operational and development processes. Data driven decisions are the new 
oil of the corporate decision making process. Business Intelligence and advanced data analytics 
are disrupting the common structure of conventional business models and value creation 
theories. 
E-commerce, digital companies, cloud computing are creating monopolies in the digital market 
that still remains highly competitive and volatile. Continuous adjustments and investments in 
R&D are needed to compete and maintain a durable competitive advantage. 
This revolution has radically changed the way of doing business confusing limits and roles of 
producers and customers. Furthermore, the labour market has also been revolutionized by 
automation and virtual intelligence. 
“Digital goods are mobile and physical presence of a company in the market country is often 
not needed”.5 Intangible properties (patents, licences, brands, trademarks, copyrights…) are the 
assets that play the most important rule in business models focused on deep use of technology. 
            
5 HADZHIEVA, E., Impact of Digitalisation on International Tax Matters, Study for the Committee on Financial 
Crimes, Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance, Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies, 
European Parliament, Luxembourg, 2019. In this paper the author is making an interesting overview of the 
challenges created by digitalisation on new ways of creating value and of company’s organization. She is also 
Source: Manchester Centre for Development Informatics, Paper No. 68, R. 
Bukht & R. Heeks, 2017. 





The digital content market is expected to grow at a CAGR of 15% in the forecast period of 2020 
– 2024.6 Artificial intelligence will study consumer behaviours analysing trends and data 
present in social media channel and blog posts. Brands using AI are expected to gain a 
sustainable competitive advantage over peers. 
The speed of change brought by the digital transformation is clear and it is generating big 
challenges in the public policy and regulations. The digitalization isn’t bringing only a new way 
of making business but is transforming also traditional principles and laws. 
Digitalization has several implications on tax policy and tax administration at both the domestic 
and international level. New business models in fact create a mismatch between taxation and 
value creation for digital activities. There is the need worldwide of interim measures and long-
term solution. 
1.2 Digital business models 
Big tech companies (the famous GAFA Companies) seem to be unstoppable with their speed 
and transformational power. Today, they are really powerful holding data and private 
information that are providing them with unfair advantage over rivals. Additionally they have 
discouraged competition in the digital sector through their resources and control.7 This fact is 
putting pressure on governments that are called to design and implement new policies that best 
fit issues brought by the digital age we are living in. 
Current international corporate tax rules are not fit for the organizations of the modern global 
economy and do not intercept business models making profit from digital services in a country 
without being physically present.  
“Tax rules also fail to recognise the new ways in which profits are created in the digital world, 
in particular the role that users play in generating value for digital companies”.8 
In fact, these companies are rapidly evolving their business models following great 
opportunities like Internet of things, Artificial Intelligence and Blockchain. Their competitive 
            
discussing and comparing BEPS Actions, unilateral DSTs and the U.S. proposals. 
6 ReportLinker, Global Digital Content Market 2020-2024, June 2020. 
7 Warren E., Here’s how we can break up Big Tech, March 8, 2019. In this blogpost the author is exploring some 
suggestions to restore healthy competition through regulations and prohibiting anti-competitive tech mergers. 




advantage is based on monopoly, network effects and extensive use of data and user-generated 
content. 
The European Commission has studied the business models of the following categories: “online 
retailer, social media model, subscription model and collaborative platform model”.9 Instead, 
the OECD, identified four business models in its Interim Report on Tax Challenges Arising 
from Digitalisation: multi-sided platforms (Uber, Facebook), resellers (Amazon, Alibaba), 
vertically integrated firms (Huawei, Amazon) and inputs suppliers (Intel).10 
Many of them have multiple business line, like Netflix which was a pure reseller at the 
beginning but then integrated film production into its business model. 
However, three main characteristics, mining the foundations and principles of the global tax 
system, have been individuated in the previously mentioned business models: 1) scale without 
mass (minimal or no need for personnel or physical establishment to operate in market 
jurisdiction), 2) reliance on intangibles, 3) data and user participation trough social networks, 
collaborative consumption, e-commerce, cloud. 
It has become very difficult to determine which is the jurisdiction eligible for taxation under 
the existing criteria and the business in many cases is managed without a physical presence in 
a country market. “This makes tax enforcement, collection and identification of business tax 
functions (people, systems, financial data) difficult”.11 Additionally, platforms through which 
are conducted transactions and exchange of services are difficult to be individuated and 
regulated. Companies, having no PE in a country and relying heavily on intangibles, structure 
themselves to minimize their tax liabilities and they prevent tax authorities to assess how 
income from such assets should be identified. 
Connected users and devices are constantly generating tons of data that are collected by 
businesses and governments. In companies wishing to enhance their performance management 
and to accelerate decision making, data analysis, supported by great traceability networks, is 
becoming the new oil. Monetizing these data is becoming one of the preferred business models 
mostly adopted by big tech companies. The challenges for policymakers are complex as the 
digital economy is massive and still growing. 
            
9 European Parliament, Impact of Digitalisation on International Tax Matters, February 2019. 
10 OECD, Interim Report on Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation, September 2017. 
11 HADZHIEVA, E., Impact of Digitalisation on International Tax Matters, Study for the Committee on Financial 
Crimes, Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance, Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies, 




Today policy-making is trying to reorganize a new range of tools to regulate the actual situation. 
In its public consultation on Fair Taxation and Digital Economy of 19 March 2018, the 
European Commission identified four business models in which value creation is not linked to 
taxation according to existing rules: 
• the digital platform mode, granting access to a marketplace, where users offer services 
among themselves in exchange for either a fee on transactions or a subscription; 
• the digital platform model, granting access to content for users in exchange for a fee; 
• the social media and advertising model, which typically involves a platform offering 
access to users for free advertising and other companies to whom the platform sell users’ 
data; 
• the distant sales model, where goods are sold via website and then physically 
delivered.12 
1.3 Why the taxation of digital Multinationals is a problem 
Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) and digital tech giants put into practice aggressive tax 
planning schemes to shift profits to low tax jurisdictions and avoid to pay fair taxes. 
In the past, many of those organizations were put under pressure by Luxembourg Leaks, 
Panama Leaks and Paradise Papers. 
Digital taxation through international consensus on nexus and profit allocation rules is a critical 
objective. The European Union seems to assume a leading role in the process for reaching an 
agreement in the international arena. European countries believe that a development of the 
digital economy is needed in order to expand and exploit its benefits, but they also think that a 
new approach must be adopted to avoid distortion of competition and of investment decisions. 
Marteen de Wilde in his thesis “Sharing the Pie; Taxing multinationals in a global market” 
clarify three distortions in the current international taxation system: “obstacles”, “disparities” 
and “inadequacies”. These factors directly influence multinationals’ decision on the actual and 
legal arrangement of their business affairs13. 
            
12 European Commission, Fair Taxation of the Digital Economy, March 21, 2018. 
13 de Wilde, Maarten Floris, 'Sharing the Pie': Taxing Multinationals in a Global Market, 43 Intertax 438, at 438-
446, May 1, 2015. The author argues that countries are adopting diverse unilateral treatments of cross-border and 
domestic business activities for tax purposes, and that they create “obstacles” in the functioning of international 
markets. Uncoordinated states’ international tax systems create gaps and overlaps producing double tax issues and 
non-taxation issues (“mismatches” – “disparities”). “Inadequacies” instead rise from outdated and flawed 




There is the need to change the rules levying taxation of cross border business income and 
restructure accordingly national laws and international treaties. 
The physical presence of a company in the market country is not needed because digital 
products and services are highly mobile or intangible. The more complex issue in the digital 
age is when you have transactions that don’t recognize borders. This aspect is creating a 
problem involving the nexus principle of the outdated international tax system. 
It’s time that the very large digital companies who are occupying larger share of the economy 
begin to contribute to the public welfare through paying due taxation. These companies 
headquarter themselves in low tax states in Europe like Ireland, Luxembourg while generating 
most of their profits in wealthy states like France, Germany, Italy where typically tax rates are 
higher. Today we tolerate the problematic that Apple, which earns about 2/3 of its revenue 
outside the United Nations, paid tax on its European operations at a rate of 0.005 percent in 
2014t”.14 
According to Pierre Moscovici “digital companies pay an average 9%effective tax rate in the 
EU compared to other firms that pay 21%”.15 European policymakers are experiencing political 
and media pressure and they are trying to address the problem through appropriate measures. 
There is a negotiation going on. The point is setting the rules for a fair taxation system in the 
digital economy where it’s difficult to identify the territorial location of a transaction.  
The big challenges are indeed regarding civil-legal and economic fairness. The situation must 
be well managed and regulated because technology companies have typically high 
capitalization and profits and they tend to pay quite low aggregate global taxes. “Multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) earn substantial rents in the current global economy. Governments have 
an interest in capturing some of these rents for their citizens or national treasuries, and 
regularly pursue policies to that end”. 
At the same time, there is the fear that these actions could lead to economic distortion enhancing 
tax competitions if MNEs move their activities to low-tax jurisdictions. Meanwhile, countries 
such as France and United Kingdom introduce unilateral measures to address the digital 
taxation bringing risks like: economic incidence of taxation on final consumers, distortion of 
investments and innovation at an international scale. 
            
14 Taylor Harriet, How Apple managed to pay a 0.005 percent tax rate in 2014, August 30, 2016. 
15 European Commission, Keynote Speech by Commissioner Moscovici at the “Master of Digital” event, Brussels, 




None uncoordinated action is recommended, but several technical and political problems have 
risen since the beginning of negotiations. Uniform measures to tax different digital business 
models have to deal with double taxation, different legislations, logistical problem tracking the 
localizations of the users, compliance issues and possible impediment to growth and 
technological progress. 
There are political dynamics behind the digital tax implementation. Even if, the imagined digital 
tax is not just against or supposed to be toward American Tech Giants, but is toward any 
company from any country in the world, the U.S.A. Government believes that this formula is 
discriminatory setting thresholds hitting exclusively their multinationals. 
It is evident that very small companies that offer internet services are not taxed at all according 
to the proposed idea of digital taxes and that the powerful Tech Giants obviously are exercising 
their influence in America to make their interests. 
There is a political discussion that is less about the physical presence in one specific market, 
it’s more about the fact that there is a perception that the market itself is driving value in some 
way. And this value need to be capture in terms of where companies pay tax. 
Various digital tax measures have been created, the frustration grew over time throughout the 
global international tax systems. Every nation feels the political imperative to move forward 
with something that will address that issue. And thus various versions of digital services taxes 
are popping up in a number of jurisdictions. This fact is underlying the current dissatisfaction 
with the existing international tax system. 
Evolution of the arm’s principles over the last couple of years is evident: it was pretty much 
generally accepted from an international tax perspective that contractual rights and ownership 
of intangible property was really the largest driver in terms of deciding where global 







Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy 
2.1 G20 and the BEPS Project 
By June 2012, the G20 Leaders publicly sustained the ambitious Action Plan on Base Erosion 
and Profit Shifting (BEPS) to fight international tax avoidance. The summer of that year, the 
work of the OECD on BEPS really began. 
In February 2013, The OECD presented a report named “Addressing Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting” stating that a set of interplaying rules would have enabled BEPS.16 The situation was 
very complicated because domestic laws and rules were not coordinated internationally, 
policymakers and tax administrations were lacking of relevant information and data. And 
actually this condition is still in place and in evolution. 
Anyway, six key areas of intervention were identified: (1) mismatches in entity and instrument 
characterization; (2) taxing profits of the digital economy; (3) intragroup financing, with 
companies in high-tax countries being loaded with debt; (4) transfer pricing issues; (5) anti-
avoidance measures like CFC regime; (6) tax heavens and preferential regimes. 
These 6 key areas were then broken down into 15 action points. In November 2015, the BEPS 
package of 15 measures was agreed by all OECD and G20 countries and endorsed by G20 
Leaders.17 
Public and expert advices were requested in order to present as soon as possible concrete 
possible solutions for closing the gaps in existing international tax rules that currently allow 
companies to hide or shift profits to low/no tax countries where little or no economic activity 
takes place. 
BEPS are real and serious problems because they can discourage tax compliance of individuals 
who are reluctant to pay taxes when large multinationals can easily avoid them. Gaps and 
loopholes between domestic laws of different countries can distort competition by providing 
            
16 OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, February 12, 2013. 




Figure 2. The BEPS Project 
international companies with competitive advantage: they affect large enterprises investment 
decisions solely on the basis of taxation rules convenience. 
Nevertheless, BEPS strategies draw their origin from mismatches in tax rules of different 
jurisdictions and they cost governments a lot of money. The sovereignty of countries and 
domestic laws are generating these problems. So only an internationally coordinated effort can 
positively change taxation rules of cross-border profits. 
In this thesis I am discussing how the OECD and Italy are interpreting the difficulties that the 
digital economy poses to international taxation. 
In specific my research is about BEPS Action 1: “Address the Tax Challenges of the Digital 
Economy”, that is the first of the 15 measures individuated by the OECD Inclusive 
Framework.18 Figure 2 provides an overall graphical presentation of the BEPS Project. As I 
said before, every action is correlated with and influences all the others. Coherence, substance 
and transparency are the three core principles guiding OECD and G20 countries in laying the 
foundations of a modern international tax framework. 
The OECD is trying to take inclusive decisions so that all countries and jurisdictions can benefit 
from a multilateral approach to tackling tax avoidance while monitoring impacts of their new 
measures on double-non-taxation and on double taxation. 
            
18 OECD, Public Discussion Draft – BEPS Action 1: Address the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, 24 
Marche 2014 – 14 April 2014, 2014. 




The Organization contributes to make tax planning more transparent and evident for tax 
authorities concerned and to effectively tax where economic activities really occur. There is a 
great commitment to understand how rules can be changed by introducing immediate applicable 
measures, or by rethinking international tax treaties or by adopting new domestic laws. 
Governments have the responsibility and the pressure to revise the rules. 
The BEPS Project, which can be surely considered the most ambitious international tax policy 
initiative ever undertaken, is using, to accomplishing its missions, a multilateral forum: the 
OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework.19 Figure 3 illustrates the representation by region of the IF 
member countries. 
Established in 2016, this sort of council currently 
has 137 members, including 66 developing 
countries. The membership of the OECD/G20 
Inclusive Framework comprises countries and 
jurisdictions from different geographic regions 
and reflects economic diversity. Inclusivity and 
diversity are positively affecting the quality of 
discussions going on and the high number of 
adhesions is a sign of great international 
commitment.20 
All members participate on equal footing and 
tangible progresses have been made up to now. 
In this Chapter, I will firstly introduce the OECD DST version and how OECD IF is working 
to change the international taxation system. 
Then, I will present the European Commission Digital Services Tax (DST) because several 
member states, including Italy, have based their unilateral DST proposals on that proposed by 
the Commission. 
            
19 The very first Inclusive Framework meeting was held in Kyoto in June 2016. There were more than 100 
delegations: G20 countries, G7 countries, developing countries and many jurisdictions were willing to sit at a 
negotiation table levelling the playing field. 
20 OECD, OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS: Progress Report July 2019-July 2020, 2020. This report 
underlines the aim of the OECD to find a comprehensive solution based on assumptions without a prejudice basis. 
Source: OECD, OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS: 
Progress Report July 2019-July 2020, 2020. 





In the end, in Chapter III, I will study the Italian Digital Service Tax comparing it to the 
precedents already mentioned. 
2.2 OECD/G20 BEPS Project, Action 1 
Addressing tax challenges brought by digitalisation, through the BEPS (Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting) Project, is a priority for the OECD. In fact, not only legal and regulatory frameworks 
have been touched by this great change, but also the international tax principles. There is the 
need to reform tax rules in order to adjust to the evolving modern global economy. 
The international tax regime we are dealing with now originated in the 1920s21: things have 
changed since then. 
For years, pillars of the global tax system determined where the taxes were due (physical 
presence based on nexus rule) and the amount of tax to be taxed (profit allocation laws based 
on the arm’s length principle). 
MNEs introduced new important phenomena mining the foundation of historical taxation 
system: scale without mass, reliance on intangible assets and the centrality of data and user 
participation. 
Intangible value drivers changed business model’s organization and processes. The allocation 
of the taxing right on cross border activities of company that have no physical proximity in the 
target market is a central issue as well as the identification of data managed by big digital 
companies and their characteristics. 
The 2015 BEPS Action Plan 1 Report on Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital 
Economy22 is trying to set the implementation of a new system aiming to solve current disputes 
over these problems. 
The remote intervention of digital activities without a taxable physical presence in the domestic 
economy is believed to be the central issue in the digital tax debate. 
            
21 For an historical background, see Ruth Mason, The Transformation of International Tax (April 15, 2020), 
American Journal of International Law, Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2020-36, 
Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 2020-08. 
22 OECD (2015), Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, Action 1 - 2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 




Since now there has been a phase of debates among the main players to decide the future of 
digital taxation. BEPS actions endeavour to provide remedies for jurisdictions in situation 
where income is subject to no or very low taxation. 
Obviously, countries have different perspectives on the extent and the nature of these challenges 
and the subsequent implementations of possible measures. 
After 2015, a new phase of work and research has been introduced to discuss policy proposals. 
The most relevant introductions are regarding the concepts of user participation, marketing 
intangibles, and significant digital presence. All these issues are directly affecting the inevitable 
change in nexus and profit allocation rules. 
On nexus is evident that taxing rights need to go beyond the actual point of reference, the 
physical presence. “On profit allocation, the significant economic presence proposal 
contemplates the use of a fractional apportionment approach with the possibility of using a 
withholding mechanism for collection while the user contribution and marketing intangible 
proposals would use a residual profit split approach”.23 
For the OECD traditional nexus requirement being tied to physical presence just doesn’t seem 
to fit the global economy anymore. Business profit should be taxed in the countries in which 
value is created, thus where users or customers are located. 
The user participation principle (that can be applied to social media platforms, search engines, 
online marketplace for example) is based on the rationale that users are providing for free data 
and information that later on are monetized by digital giants. For this reason, states are thinking 
about a reallocation of profits of relevant businesses in those countries in which users are 
located. 
There is this sense that users are providing real value and that their countries ought to be 
remunerated for that in some way. The problem is that currently we don’t tax inputs into 
companies production. 
The marketing intangible proposal instead (this solution is applicable to a broader range of 
businesses) treats the link between a market jurisdiction and marketing intangibles related to 
that jurisdiction. 
The tax administration is trying to discuss difficult policy trade-offs, providing certainty and 
predictability through the use of simplified methods. The debate going on is aiming to ensure a 
            
23 OECD/G20 BEPS, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy, Public Consultation 




level playing field between small and large jurisdictions as well as the potential effect of the 
various options on revenue and taxpayer behaviours. 
2.3 The road to a consensus-based long-term solution 
I will try to reassume the most important milestones reached by Members of the OECD/G20 
Inclusive Framework on BEPS (IF) so far. 
There has been a great effort to take into consideration different opinions engaging a broad 
range of stakeholders (governments, companies, civil society…) to reach a comprehensive, 
consensus-based solution on the taxation of the digital economy. 
October 2015: 
BEPS Action 1 - Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy. 
In this report the concept of digitalization of the economy was clearly defined without providing 
solutions in terms of corporate income tax or mechanisms ensuring that digital companies 
would be paying fair shares of taxes where they operate. As a consequence, many unilateral 
measures crossed the mind of frustrated national policymakers across the world. 
March 2018: 
Delivery of the Interim Report. 
The document showed real progresses and determined common features to be addressed and 
the analysis of different digital models. 
January 2019: 
Delivery of Policy Note. 
This note expressed the agreement to examine proposals involving a two-pillar approach, Pillar 
1 and 2, which could have formed the basis for consensus. This document also introduces 
something unusual: the fact that, under Pillar 1, solutions would have gone beyond the Arm’s 
Length Principle. 
28 May 2019: 
Programme of Work to Develop a Consensus Solution to the Tax Challenges Arising from the 
Digitalisation of the Economy. 
November 2019: 
Public Consultation 






Global Anti-Base Erosion (GloBE) Proposal under Pillar Two. 
January 2020: 
Statement by the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS on the Two-Pillar Approach to 
Address the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy. 
Many tax people thought nothing would have come out of this BEPS Project. But to 
everybody’s surprise, the OECD met its deadlines, and made lots of recommendations 
including some mandatory recommendations to the OECD countries and the G20 countries. 
2.3.1 Three proposals for new profit allocation and nexus rules 
Today there are evident distressed trends in the international tax system. On one side there are 
many tax disputes, unilateral measures and dissatisfaction on allocation of taxing rights. On the 
other side there isn’t a common way to approach highly digitalised MNEs. Currently there are 
three proposals for the re-allocation of taxing rights from the Inclusive Framework members.  
• The first (active user participation24) proposal is coming from the UK and the European 
countries: they are sustaining that, in the system/world coming from the digitalization, 
there are new business models (social media platforms, search engines, online 
marketplaces) where companies are making large use of people’s data and monetizing 
these information in a third country. They want to tax highly digitalized business models 
by setting fresh rules. E-commerce is not new and there have always been cross boarders 
transactions without physical presence in different territories, they do not want 
necessary to change that, but they are fully committed to regulate taxation in case of 
highly digitalized business models. This proposal however wouldn’t apply outside the 
digital space. 
• The second one is a proposal coming from U.S.A. and it is subsequent to the Tax Cuts 
and Jobs Act (TCJA). Americans rethought their laws in different international taxation 
matters. They adopted a marketing intangibles approach through the introduction of the 
            
24 Aqib Aslam and Alpa Shah, Tec(h)tonic Shifts: Taxing the “Digital Economy”, IMF Working Paper, May 2020. 
At page 8, the two authors describe users’ interactions with digitalised businesses: their role, their behaviours, and 




GILTI (Global Intangible Low-Tax Income).25 The U.S. have always expressively been 
against ring-fencing the digital economy trying to find a broader range of rules to pull 
in profit coming from different sectors. They argue that the system should recognize 
more taxing rights to markets where there is big return, excess return, above normal 
return, due to an interaction or a sustainable engagement with the market through 
advertisement or through marketing intangibles. “GILTI is intended to approximate the 
income from intangible assets (such as patents, trademarks, and copyrights) held 
abroad”. Brand and trade name can favourably influence customers’ minds and this 
value creation is generated in the market jurisdiction. Customer data, customer 
relationships and customer lists rises from an exchange with the population of the 
market jurisdiction. The connection between substantial activities and returns generated 
by marketing intangibles is difficult to detect.26 
• The third proposal is supported by India, Colombia and by other developing countries. 
They are promoting the significant economic presence approach which is aiming to 
tackle problems cause by existing PE rules. Non-resident digital companies are 
substantially involved in the economic life of a jurisdiction without a significant 
physical presence. This proposal is studying factors that evidence a purposeful and 
sustained interaction with market jurisdiction. Examples of these connections are 
represented by the existence of a user base, of a website with local languages, of high 
volume of digital transactions with local forms of payment, of sustained promotional 
advertisement activities.27 
The OECD didn’t aggregate these preferences, it is not aiming to put forward the three 
competing proposals. It can take them only in consideration. It is clear that the OECD is 
sustaining a unique proposal, the Secretariat Proposal. 
The OECD Public Consultation Document “Secretariat Proposal for a ‘Unified Approach’ 
under Pillar One”, published in November 2019, states literally “the proposals included in this 
            
25 Pomerleau Kyle, What’s up with Being GILTI?, Tax Foundation, March 14, 2019. In this article the author 
clarifies the structure and purpose of GILTI. For more information see: Tax Policy Centre, What is global 
intangible low-taxed income and how is it taxed under TCJA?, May 2020. 
26 OECD/G20 BEPS, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy, Public Consultation 
Document, 13 February – 6 March 2019. 
27 OECD/G20 BEPS, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy, Public Consultation 




consultation document have been prepared by the Secretariat, and do not represent the 
consensus views of the Inclusive Framework, the Committee on Fiscal Affairs (CFA) or their 
subsidiary bodies”.28 
At the moment the U.S. and the UK proposals seem to be considered whereas the 
Indian/developing countries perspective is absent. In effect, the Secretariat Proposal is the only 
one on the discussion table, there is no other conversations on other proposals.29 
According to Allison Christians this is very unusual because normally the OECD is an 
aggregator of the policy preferences of its membership. A century ago the League of Nations 
adopted the same behaviour: without aggregating preferences, it pushed out several model 
agreements leading to a number of meetings over years and to the rises of bilateral tax treaties. 
The League of Nations aim was that those bilateral treaties would eventually create a de-facto 
harmonization leading to a potential multilateral agreement someday.30 
So the OECD Secretariat Proposal is presenting a weakness: there is no “Plan B”. Peter A. 
Barnes and H. David Rosenbloom sustain that the Secretariat proposal is absorbing all the 
oxygen in the international tax world and that “the sooner the OECD unveils its proposal, the 
sooner we can all analyse it and consider alternatives that might more successfully light the 
night”.31 
Plan B is represented by all unilateral digital taxes and the proliferation of them in different 
countries is representing a threat for the future of international taxation system. So by now there 
is no plan B and a strong hope to reach a consensus-based solution as soon as possible. 
  
            
28 OECD, Public Consultation Document - “Secretariat Proposal for a ‘Unified Approach’ under Pillar One”, 
OECD Publishing, November, 2019. 
29 The OECD’’s Secretariat proposal is the only solution that provide for an international community agreement. 
The OECD staked an enormous amount of its institutional reputation on being the only body that can deliver a 
consensus based solution. 
30 Christians Allison, and Tarcisio Diniz Magalhaes, A New Global Tax Deal for the Digital Age, Canadian Tax 
Journal 67.4 (2019): 1153-1178. 
31 Tax Notes Federal, A Seat at the Table: Thought Leaders Discuss OECD’s Plans on Digital Economy Taxation, 




2.4 The OECD Programme of Work to Develop a Consensus Solution 
The OECD has identified several tax challenges belonging to two different category of taxes: 
for indirect taxes, BEPS Action 1 is addressing the collection of Value Added Taxes (VAT) 
and Goods and Services Taxes (GST) on the online purchase volume of goods and services 
from foreign suppliers; as regard direct taxes, Action 1 is targeting different digital issues 
related to nexus rules, data and characterisation.32 
In the Policy Note Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy, 
approved on 23 January 2019, the Inclusive Framework (IF) members decided to provide 
solutions to the mentioned issues through proposals belonging to two pillars which could 
hopefully form the basis for consensus. 
• Pillar One reviews international profit allocation and nexus rules via the “Unified 
Approach” Proposal; 
• Pillar Two aims to establish rules ensuring that the profits of internationally operating 
businesses are subject to a minimum rate of tax thanks to the “GloBE” Proposal.33 
            
32 OECD (2020), Statement by the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS on the Two-Pillar Approach to 
Address the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy, OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework, 
Paris, January 30, 2020. 
33 OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy - Policy Note, the Inclusive 
Framework on BEPS, January 23,2019. Even if the two proposals are targeting challenges of completely different 
nature, the International Framework thought that these issues had to be studied and developed in parallel as they 
could complete each other leading to potential reinforcing effects. 
Source: OECD Tax Talks # 14 slides, OECD Two-Pillar Approach, Centre for Tax 
Policy and Administration, January 31, 2020. 




Despite the pandemic crisis and the fireworks after U.S. temporary withdrawal from 
negotiations, the OECD IF is making very good progresses and plans to release final blueprints 
on both pillars by October 2020. 
The OECD Secretariat is trying to facilitate the conversations between different countries with 
regular public consultations: the final goal is that of finding a common solution which would 
fix problem in the long term. They are discussing to effectively change the rules to have a better 
system agreed by everybody and that changes rules in practice. 
They are aiming to reduce ambiguity, to give an idea of practicability as regard the approach 
under Pillar 1 and Pillar 2.34 
The secretariat proposal has the objective to design a common solution that would address the 
nexus and profit allocation rules for large MNEs groups (highly digitalised and consumer facing 
business) and at the same time to improve disputes resolution and prevention. 
The Unified Approach is seeking an agreement, by the end of 2020, between the three proposals 
for new profit allocation and nexus rules advanced by UK, U.S., and developing countries. It 
focuses on a fair reallocation of taxing rights to market or user jurisdictions on nexus criteria 
unconstrained by physical presence and trying to reduce complexity at every stage. 
The OECD approach is not moving away from the current ALP. It is simply going beyond the 
ALP, and it is using basilar formula and proxies. Policymakers need to find a way of coexisting 
with the ALP, limiting disruption and avoiding double tax and tax disputes. 
The Unified Approach clearly needs to deal with the interactions with the ALP system. OECD 
members are structuring the new income allocation system and the new taxing rights with the 
ALP. They are looking to target the upper level of profitability of the more profitable 
companies. 
There has been an economic analysis by collecting data, processing data, struggling with lack 
of data, to have significant information. They need lots of work to do and the outcome, the 
impact assessment, will depend on the number of hypothesis which still need to be decided. 
They have trends, country specific data that they need to cross-checks with other countries. 
They have not detailed data, but they are struggling to solve this problem. 
            
34 Several OECD Tax Talks are available at: https://www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-talks-webcasts.htm. These talks, hold 
by experts form the Centre for Tax Policy ad Administration, are providing the latest update on the progress made 
on the BEPS Project and some corporate tax statistics. They have the objective of clarifying the results achieved, 




The agreement on a common solution is absolutely challenging because it has political 
implications. Doubts about reaching a global agreement on digital tax have been steadily 
growing and every effort is questioned and analysed. 
J. E. Stiglitz said that the OECD is gradualist and that current efforts are far from adequate. He 
claims that two subsidiaries belonging to the same multinational, exchanging goods and 
services across borders, value their trade “at arm’s length”, a principle that is inefficient because 
sometimes there are no competitive markets to which a firm can refer. Matters are very 
problematic in the services sector: for example, it is very difficult to value a production process 
without the managerial services provided by headquarters.35 
There is now an ongoing economic analysis and impact assessment regarding: Pillar 1 (nexus 
and profit allocation rules) and Pillar 2 (global anti base erosion proposal which tries to ensure 
that a minimum level of taxation is paid by multinationals). 
I have noticed that IF members are showing a strong support and full commitment for reaching 
a multilateral agreement with respect to Pillar 1 and 2. The process is going on strongly and the 
OECD members affirmed in Paris, by the end of January 2020, that they want to respect the 
G20 mandate timeline. 
It is really important to remember that all members are working to find a consensus-based 
solution while respecting common principles with no prejudices. 
The Inclusive Framework members showed a constructive attitude agreeing upon an outline of 
the architecture of a Unified Approach on Pillar One as the basis for negotiations and 
welcoming the progress made on Pillar Two.36 
There is the high risk that many jurisdictions will adopt uncoordinated unilateral tax measures 
as national Digital Services Tax if the OECD IF will not deliver a comprehensive consensus-
based solution this year. 
  
            
35 Stiglitz, Joseph E., No more half-measures on corporate taxes, Columbia Business School, Project Syndicate, 7 
October 2019. Stiglitz argues that “the current proposals for reforming global taxation simply don’t go far enough” 
and that “the OECD is canonizing gradualism” 
36 OECD (2020), Statement by the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS on the Two-Pillar Approach to 
Address the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy, OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework, 




2.4.1 Pillar 1 – The Unified Approach 
 
 
The architecture of the “Unified Approach” under Pillar 1 was drafted with inputs from the 
public consultations process and directed from the IF and Steering group. A recommended 
approach that draw its origins from the three concurrent proposals which have been put on the 
table by UK, USA, India. To have an overall understanding of the proposal the reader can 
observe Figure 5. 
This Pillar is about a new taxing right agreement determining which companies will be in scope 
and of course the nexus of market jurisdictions to receive an allocation under Amount A 
(quantum of this amount, how is it calculated, allocation process). The clear purpose of this 
pillar is to reallocate a share of multinational companies’ taxable profits to market jurisdictions. 
The aim of this proposal is to allocate “routine” profits on the basis of the existing international 
tax system but to redistribute some “residual profit” to market jurisdictions (destination 
countries).37 
Proposed reallocation of taxing rights (trough nexus and scope) under Pillar 1 would require 
improved tax certainty, including effective and binding dispute prevention and resolution 
mechanisms (those final mechanisms need to be developed so that the package will be 
complete). 
            
37 To understand principles and criteria to determine MNE group’s non-routine profit see: Byrnes William, Byrnes’ 
Comments son the OECD’s “Unified Approach” to Allocation of Profits of Digital Business, Texas A&M 
University of law, Kluwer International Tax Blog, October 10, 2019. 
Source: OECD Tax Talks # 16 slides, Update on Pillar One, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, July 22, 2020. 




In design and implementation of the solution, IF acknowledges the need to minimise 
complexity. This aspect is not obvious because there are also many developing/emerging 
countries involved and their economies. 
Pillar 1 proposal for the Unified Approach articulates new layers impacting on scope, new 
nexus and profit allocation rules that should coexist with the existing transfer pricing rules, 
granting tax certainty in the system. This is a very ambitious task. 
In the Unified Approach there are two critical dimensions: scope and nexus. 
As regard the scope, the IF members are looking to large size MNE groups/businesses in term 
of global revenues (this represents the most possible indicator among those taken in 
consideration). Gross revenue threshold could, for instance, be the same as for CbC reporting 
(MNE groups with gross revenue exceeding EUR750M). But also additional thresholds will be 
considered such as the aggregate in-scope revenue and the profitability of certain segments to 
narrow the pull of companies within the scope. 
The main activities that will be treated into this proposal are related to enterprises that are likely 
to derive meaningful value from interactions with consumers /users in market jurisdictions. 
There are two main categories of business models within the scope: 
1) automated digital services (ADS) provided on a standardised basis to large population of 
customers though highly digitalized business models (online advertisement, intermediation 
platforms, online search engines, social media platforms, cloud computing services, digital 
content screening, online gaming…)38; 
2) consumer facing businesses (CFBs)with B2B and B2C business models, engaging with 
their customer base through targeted marketing, branding and use of individual data. Examples 
include personal computing products, clothes, branded foods, franchise models, automobiles. 
The draft pillar 1 blueprint report excludes from the scope of Amount A: extractive industries, 
commodities, financial services sector, construction, international airline and shipping 
businesses.39 Products for commercial and professional use would be exempted.40 
            
38 An updated non-exhaustive list of business models that the OECD defines as “automated digital services” is 
available at page 10 of the following document: Statement by the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS on 
the Two-Pillar Approach to Address the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy, 
OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework, Paris, January 30, 2020. 
39 Finley R., Soong Johnston S., New Detail on OECD’s Pillar 1 Proposal Emerges in Draft Report, 99 Tax Notes 
Int’l, p. 718, August 10, 2020. 
40 Flignor P., Geelen P., De Rosa M., OECD statement of Digital Tax Initiative highlights progress, sets timeline 




Now, if there is a big multinational or if a large section of activities of a certain company is 
within the scope, OECD’s criteria need to assess the connection among this company/group 
and the particular market jurisdiction. 
Here comes the problem of nexus rules. New rules will not be constrained by traditional or 
existing physical presence to establish a nexus, they will look to different measures of MNE 
groups interactions with the particular market: it has to be a sustained and significant 
involvement with that economy. 
The Unified Approach will look to revenue thresholds with adaptations to take into account the 
respective size of the market jurisdiction/economy to satisfy both larger and smaller markets 
with a possibility to have a minimum level of activities required to fall in the nexus rules. 
OECD representatives are looking to a more than 1 year picture of the MNEs activities with 
particular market. They do not want to disturb the existing system in bilateral treaties (no impact 
on PE rules for example..). They are looking to a more global assessment of the activities of the 
group and the application of these provisions in many different countries. They are avoiding to 
change existing concepts in bilateral treaties of PE that would create spill over effects. 
Automated digital businesses are conducting their activities through the concept of “scale 
without mass”, therefore the revenue threshold will be the only test to establish a nexus. For 
consumer facing business additional factors will be considered. 
Profit allocation rules are determining how much profit will be allocated in a particular market 
jurisdiction or how countries will be entitled to tax. Three types of returns have been discussed: 
Amounts A, B, C. These amounts are the core elements of the proposal. 
Amount A concerns the new taxing rights, B is about the improvement of the existing ALP 
system and C is about disputes resolution and prevention. 
I will try to explain how the Unified Approach’s three tier profit allocation mechanism works: 
1) Amount A [portion (%) of deemed residual profit], 2) Amount B [fixed return for distribution 
functions], 3) Amount C [additional return based on TP analysis]. 
Amount A - It is the new taxing rights over residual profits that has to be determined in a 
formulaic manner at an MNE Group or segment level. This is the primary response to the tax 
challenges posed by the digitalisation of the economy. This is the amount attributed to digital 
Permanent Establishment. 
OECD members would like to concentrate on group consolidated accounts, isolating different 




lines). Business line or regional segmentation may be required when a company has in-scope 
and out-of-scope activities. 
So they start from the total profits of the group, they exclude a portion of that profitability which 
is deemed to reflect routine profit (it will be a given percentage) to define the excess. 
Then, they will take a portion of this excess and will allocate it to the market or user jurisdiction. 
In their term this procedure will be equivalent to the upper portion of profitability. This upper 
residual portion of profit is then allocable to market jurisdictions. They are using proxies, an 
approach of deeming routine and residual profit. 
It is correct to mention that the threshold levels of “deemed routine” or the “portion that will be 
allocable to market jurisdictions” are yet to be agreed: these key elements will form the basis 
of the blueprint that the OECD will present in October 2020.41 
Amount B - This is not creating new taxing rights. There is no significant interaction between 
Amounts A and B, and that’s because Amount A is an allocation of residual profit and Amount 
B is an allocation of routine profits associated with baseline marketing and distribution 
activities. Amount B is supposed to be determined at arm’s length principles. Furthermore it is 
not directly related to the digital issues but it was included in the package as an attempt to try 
to simplify some aspects of Transfer Pricing and to reduce the administrative burden. Amount 
B is dealing with the improvement of the existing Transfer Pricing System and is intended to 
be applied to marketing and distribution functions. The goal is that of trying to fix a 
remuneration for distribution functions with extreme clarity to reduce the number of litigations 
in small developing countries. Policymakers are exploring different ways in which that might 
be achieved. They contemplate a baseline level of activities that would form the core of a fixed 
return approach by industry and region. 
According to Stewart Brant, head of the Centre for Tax Policy and Administration’s transfer 
pricing unit, the following activities are probably going to be included in Amount B: 
“importation of products, logistics, warehousing, limited sales and marketing staff, sales and 
order processing and finance functions”.42 In any case a final agreement on this positive list has 
not yet been reached. 
            
41 The OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration regularly updates stakeholders on recent developments 
and key issues to be solved in the upcoming months. Under Amount B there are still many benchmarking studies 
to be done on profitability indicators, on further technical details and definitions of baseline activities differentiated 
by industry or region. 
42 Finley Ryan, OECD’s Technical Work on Formulary Pillar 1 Approach on Schedule, 99 Tax Notes Int’l, p. 531, 




This Amount B only applies where there is a physical presence and could be interesting for 
developing countries because typically multinationals manipulate profits of distribution 
companies (through aggressive tax planning) and existing tax rules do not capture the value 
creation of localized marketing functions.43 
Tax certainty (Amount C) - This component of the Unified Approach package used to be 
called Amount C since few weeks ago and as Amount B it is not setting new taxing rights. It is 
trying to address a certainty agenda of dispute prevention and resolution to prevent double 
taxation and end disagreement between taxpayers and tax administrations. Amount C it’s an 
arm’s length return for value-adding functions in traditional PE and subsidiary situations. If a 
company is realizing more than sales and marketing in a jurisdiction it is gaining additional 
returns, but through Amount C the company complies with binding and mandatory arbitrations 
in case of disputes. 
There is an overall purpose of providing certainty for A, B, C. How to achieve tax certainty is 
different from Amount A that from Amount B&C (which involve more bilateral treaties or 
disputes). 
The certainty agenda, in particular, refers to amount A: it is trying to make sure that amount A 
is calculated and administered in a way that is as certain as possible. 
Amount A is going to be applied on a multilateral basis: disputes will likely affect the taxation 
of Amount A in multiple jurisdictions. A new effective and binding dispute prevention and 
resolution mechanisms is required for Amount A. 
According to a copy of the Draft Pillar 1 Blueprint Report delivered on August 3 2020 by the 
OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration and the Committee on Fiscal Affairs to Tax 
Notes there should be two distinct dispute prevention and resolution mechanisms for Amount 
A and beyond Amount A. 
As regard early tax certainty and prevent disputes for Amount A, there are some standardized 
self-assessment return and documentation package for MNE groups, available for the 
calculation of Amount A and the allocation between relevant jurisdictions.44 
The lead administration, which probably will be the jurisdiction where the parent company is 
located, will have to file these documents with the group and validate the overall return. The 
entire package then is sent to the other tax administrations relevant to the MNE’s operations. 
            
43 Martin Hearson, The OECD's Digital Tax Proposal: Untangling the Impact of 'Pillar One' on Developing 
Countries, International Centre for Tax and Development Blog, 10 October, 2019. 
44 Finley R., Soong Johnston S., New Detail on OECD’s Pillar 1 Proposal Emerges in Draft Report, 99 Tax Notes 




If a MNE group would like to have early certainty for Amount A, the group should require to 
the lead tax administration an initial assessment with a panel review comprising representatives 
of affected (six to eight) tax administrations if needed. 
Once the review is performed the MNE group can approve or refuse the outcome. However, if 
an agreement is not reach on Amount A, then a determination panel will be created and its 
decision will be binding. 
Draft Pillar 1 Blueprint Report anticipates that “a significant majority of MNE groups within 
the scope of Amount A submit a request for tax certainty for the first year(s) following the 
introduction of the rules”.45 
On the contrary, Amount B is in a bilateral world: Amount B will reach tax certainty mainly 
agreeing on using fixed rates of return on baseline distribution and marketing activities. 
Tax certainty building block involves disputes under the existing Transfer Pricing system. On 
one hand there are countries that have adopted in their policy (treaty policy) the mandatory / 
binding arbitration, while on the other hand there are countries that do not such policy. 
The OECD is trying to explore a new system based on multilateral aspects and bilateral 
relationships, it is trying to bridge existing gaps. The OECD is exploring innovative approaches 
to dispute resolution and is enhancing MAP and domestic measures.  
The draft report underlines the need of a new multilateral convention that provides an 
international framework to coordinate multiple jurisdictions’ provisions and that, in the 
determination of Amount A and in the elimination of double taxation, would overrule all 
bilateral tax treaties.46 According to the report this would be the best way to remove treaty 
obstacles to the implementation of Pillar 1. 
Obviously the new multilateral convention infrastructure as well as its legal functioning require 
ongoing works in a number of areas: definitions, proxies, percentages, differentiation for 
business models, use of financial accounting and business line segmentation, elimination of 
double taxation, treatment of losses and implementation / administration. 
            
45 Finley R., Soong Johnston S., New Detail on OECD’s Pillar 1 Proposal Emerges in Draft Report, 99 Tax Notes 
Int’l, p. 718, August 10, 2020. 
46 Soong Johnston S., OECD Draft Blueprint Mulls New Pillar 1 Multilateral Convention, 99 Tax Notes Int’l, p. 




Any agreement on the solution to adopt would require the withdrawal of all unilateral measures 
that the Inclusive Framework members have already implemented to resolve challenges of the 
digital economy. Unilateral Digital Services Taxes are clear examples. 
The OECD aims to deliver to the G20 finance ministers a final blueprint report by October 
2020, a starting point to reach a real international political agreement. At the moment this 
timeline seems to be unrealistic given the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic and political 
difficulties. 
Many are expecting that the report on the Pillar 1 blueprint will leave uncomplete crucial 
elements of the proposed regime, such as the formula for the reallocation to market countries 
of profits generated by a multinational group. At the moment, the minimum tax rate under Pillar 
2 still needs to be determined.47 
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2.4.2 Pillar 2 – The GloBE Proposal 
 
Pillar 1 is a question of “where you tax??”, Pillar 2 is a about “whether large businesses are 
taxed”, so it’s a question of minimum taxation, a certain minimum tax that all international 
operating businesses should pay. There is no architecture and no unified approach for this pillar, 
they are exploring some parameters. This Pillar is not limited specifically to the digital 
economy, because it addresses more widely profit shifting. 
This pillar aims to eliminate risks related to mechanisms of profit-shifting to jurisdictions where 
multinationals can be subject to no, or very low, taxation (race to the bottom). 
While respecting the sovereign right of each jurisdictions to set its own tax rates, Pillar 2 
proposal strengthen the power of all countries to tax back profits where other jurisdictions have 
not sufficiently exercised their primary taxing rights at the agreed minimum rate.48 
GloBE proposal was initially proposed by Germany and France and it was inspired to the 
“GILTI” (Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income) regime and the “BEAT” (Base Erosion and 
Anti-Abuse Tax) introduced by the U.S. in December 2017 through the “TCJA” - Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act.49 
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The best way to fight profit shifting and tax competition probably is to introduce a global 
minimum corporate effective tax rate which would discourage low tax jurisdictions to set tax 
rates below this minimum. 
The introduction of a global minimum level of tax will influence behaviours of both taxpayers 
and jurisdictions. Taxpayers should be discourage to engage in profit shifting and jurisdictions 
will have a common floor to preserve and increase the attractiveness of a given area as a location 
to carry out business operations.50 
However, things under Pillar 2 are in track and various design options remain under discussion. 
For example the Inclusive Framework has not yet fixed the actual minimum rate to be applied 
under GloBE proposal.51 
I will try to reassume the main purposes and the rationale of Pillar 2: 
1) ensuring that all internationally operating businesses pay a minimum level of tax; 
2) address remaining BEPS issues; 
3) multilateral solution to avoid uncoordinated rules, increased complexity and risk of over-
taxation; 
4) reduce pressure on developing countries that, in a race to the bottom, become even more 
dependent on natural resource taxation to finance their public needs, while enlarging the number 
of free zones or other incentives to attract foreign direct investments; 
5) address profit shifting risk from intangibles but not ring-fenced to digital economy; 
6) lay down a structure coexisting with the U.S. recent GILTI regime. 
Pillar 2 is a combination of two inter-related sets of rules capturing income subject to taxation 
below a still-to-be-agreed minimum rate. There are many rules interplaying in this proposal so 
I have inserted Figure 6 in the text to help the reader to visualize the framework under 
discussion. The first set of rules treats a global controlled foreign corporation rule, while the 
second applies to deductible payments made to recipients and taxed below the minimum rate.52 
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The first one link profits generated by foreign subsidiaries or branches, that are taxed at a rate 
below the agreed minimum rate, to the taxable income of a group parent. These profits would 
be taxed in the parent jurisdiction by taking in consideration the gap between the effective 
foreign tax rate and the minimum tax rate. 
There are two rules addressing this problem: the income inclusion rule that would be a domestic 
rule requiring a shareholder to report a proportionate share of the income of a subsidiary where 
income is not taxed enough and the switch-over rule that enable the application of the income 
inclusion rule to foreign branches and subsidiaries that would otherwise exempted under 
bilateral tax treaties. 
The income inclusion rule is something that many countries already have in the form of CFC 
rules, so the basic mechanisms are familiar to taxpayers and tax administrations. It focuses on 
outbound investments.53 This rule would grant the minimum taxation of a multinational group’s 
income, protecting the tax base of the parent jurisdiction as well as other jurisdictions where 
the group operates by reducing the incentive to put in place intra-group financing, or other profit 
shifting strategies.54 The OECD International Framework is making a large use of financial 
accounts as a starting point for income determination and it is studying how to address different 
tax and financial accounting systems. 
As I mentioned before, the IF is struggling to reduce complexity and potential complaints costs 
and it is carrying on the technical work on the combination of low-tax and high-tax income to 
determine the effective tax rate. 
Where multinationals’ income is taxed below the minimum rate, the income inclusion rule 
would apply as a top up to achieve the minimum rate of tax. This would create a global standard 
that sets a floor for tax competition and a level playing field for all jurisdictions. 
The problem is that today there is significant variance in corporate income tax rate across 
Inclusive Framework members. 
There are some concerns about whether the design of the income inclusion rule should be based 
on a country-by-country basis (tax competition could be restricted to a certain extent) or a global 
            
53 See Lammers Jeroen, Less is More - Can Developing Countries Gain Tax Revenue by Giving up Taxing Rights?, 
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blending basis (competition may prosper as high tax and low tax rate of different countries are 
blended with each other).55 
The adoption of a fixed global percentage tax rate, that provides transparency and smooths rule 
coordination, seems to be the simplest approach to adopt.56 
The switch over rule should be introduced into tax treaties to permit a residence jurisdiction to 
switch form an exemption to a credit method for profits attributable to a PE that are subject to 
an effective rate below the minimum rate.57 
The second key element of this proposal contains tax on base-eroding payments with the 
undertaxed payment rule (under domestic legislation) denying deductions or imposing source-
based taxation in respect of intra-group payments (not subject to tax or above a minimum rate) 
and the subject-to-tax rule (under tax treaty legislation) imposing withholding tax at source on 
payments made to recipients taxed below the minimum rate and denying treaty benefits on 
items of income where the payment is not subject to tax at the minimum rate.58 
Under these rules if a company in State A made a payment to the subsidiary in State B and the 
receipt in State B is subject to an effective tax rate below a certain threshold, then A could deny 
a deduction or impose a tax on the payment. 
Several countries see the undertaxed payment rule as a backstop, a defensive rule, to the income 
inclusion rule. 
The OECD’s Pillar 2 suggests that both MNE’s residence states (income inclusion rule) as well 
as MNE’s source states (undertaxed payment rule) could set a minimum taxation regime. Both 
the income inclusion and the undertaxed payment rules would address low tax states and tax 
heaves. 
The undertaxed payment rule is applicable only if a company has a taxable subsidiary or PE in 
the source state. If a low taxed company sells products or deliver services, without a nexus, in 
other states, then only the income inclusion is applicable. 
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The inclusion of foreign profits in the domestic income generates as a consequence worldwide 
income taxation. Foreign rates below the domestic minimum tax rate would no more attract 
domestic investments and profits, and all domestic taxpayers would face the same minimum 
tax burden regardless of where they earn profits. 
The OECD proposal is suggesting both source-based and residence-based taxation granting all 
states the right to tax revenues generated by minimum taxation. So an international agreement 
on which states, in which cases has the priority in taxing low taxed or untaxed foreign profits 
is absolutely needed. 
A priority rule, for example, could assign the taxing right to the source state with the obligation 
of the residence state to avoid double taxation or it could limit source taxation in favour of 
residence taxation.59 
There is still the need of further considerations on how the four rules (income inclusion, switch-
over, undertaxed payment, subject-to-tax) will interact. Relevant practical and policy issues 
may arise in the future because these rules will inevitably make changes in domestic laws and 
double tax treaties. 
There is a clear understanding that the situation should not lead to the contemporaneous 
application of different rules. OECD researchers are trying to avoid double taxation, there is 
the need of rules’ coordination in design and practice. Unilateral actions to attract more tax base 
and to protect existing tax base, would generate bad consequences for all countries.60 The IF is 
targeting also simplifications to reduce compliance costs, and compatibility with international 
treaty obligations. 
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2.5 Evidence and analysis of combined effects of Pillar 1 & 2 
The OECD estimates that the combined effect of Pillars 1 & 2 would generate global net 
revenue up to 4% global CIT (Corporate Income Tax) revenues, that is around USD 100 billion 
annually.61 
Across country groupings divided in high, middle low-income economies, revenue gains are 
expected to be quite similar. 
The Inclusive Framework collected data from a wide range of countries (more than 200 
jurisdictions: 137 IF members + developing countries) and from more than 27000 MNE groups. 
They try to rely as much as possible on firm-level data (taxes, profits and activities of 
multinationals) combined with aggregate data on a country-by-country reporting basis. The IF 
delegates are processing and studying these data with academics and countries’ experts. 
They have taken best data available since year 2016 and they are refining the dataset through 
the interactions with member countries. They aim to update the database as the process go 
along. 
In determining the Amount A, under Pillar 1, they are considering MNE groups as a whole 
rather than entity-by-entity. First of all they asses the total profit of the MNE Group, then they 
fix a “Profitability threshold” (e.g. X% on Profit Before Tax to Turnover ratio) and profit above 
this threshold is considered “Non-Routine Profit”. Then a share of this “Non-Routine Profit” is 
calculated thanks to a percentage Y% and allocated to market jurisdictions. 
Well, up to now, the OECD IF has still to determine the key parameters X% and Y%. So the 
estimates will be definitively determined when an official consensus-based decision will be 
taken by the Inclusive Framework. 
Under Pillar 2, the GloBE proposal offers countries the right to “tax back” profit that is currently 
taxed below the minimum rate abroad. The mechanism works as a “top-up” tax to reach the 
level of the minimum tax rate. 
This rate needs still to be determined by the IF. What they have been doing is to model the 
effects of a range of possible minimum tax rates. Another relevant decision the OECD will take 
is concerning the way this minimum rate is applied: whether it will be done on global profit of 
multinationals or jurisdictions by jurisdictions. 
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They have tried to take into account some behavioural reactions of multinationals and 
governments in their analysis and they suppose that those reactions will be more pronounced 
for Pillar 2. 
Figure 7 considers four scenarios: 
Scenario 1, a static scenario with no behavioural reactions; 
Scenario 2 which takes into account the simultaneous implementation of Pillar1 and Pillar 2 
and their interactions; 
Scenario 3 describes the situation in which multinationals, in reaction to Pillar 2, may change 
their profit shifting strategies, here Pillar 2 would reduce tax rates differentials between 
jurisdictions and it would reduce the incentives for multinationals to shift profits to low tax 
jurisdictions; 
Scenario 4 is the most uncertain because it takes into account also the reactions of governments: 
it may be that some low-tax jurisdictions, where the tax rate is currently below the minimum 
tax rate, could increase their tax rates to collect part of the gain generated by the GloBE 
proposal. 
So according to the parameters used by the OECD, in Scenarios 3 and 4 the overall tax revenue 
gain is close to 4% of global CIT revenues that represents around USD 100 billion per year. 
Source: OECD, Webcast: Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy, Update on the Economic Analysis & 
Impact Assessment, February 13, 2020. 




Pillar One generates about 0.5% of global CIT ($15 billion) and Pillar Two accounts for the 
remaining 3% (approximately $85 billion).62 
Around 40% of multinational profits are shifted to tax heavens globally each year (more than 
$600 billion).63 This practice reduces corporate income tax revenue by more than $200 billion 
that is equal to 10% of global corporate tax receipts64. 
According to Figure 8, taken by the OECD, the level of revenue gains would be almost 
homogeneous between low, middle income and developed countries. 
However this picture presents misleading results because low and middle income countries 
together form about two-thirds65 of the total number of countries and they receive just over 25% 
of the total global revenue in terms of corporate income tax. 
Additionally middle-income countries dispose of many natural resources attracting foreign 
investments and they are more likely to be affected by tax avoidance practices.66 
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Therefore, by looking at the same results taking in consideration “compensation” for tax 
revenue lost to avoidance, it becomes evident that the rewards for developing countries are quite 




According to the OECD direct effects on investment costs is expected to be modest in most 
countries because many firms will be unaffected by the proposals which target firms with high 
level of profitability and low effective tax rates. The reform should reduce the influence of 
corporate tax rates on investment locations. Other factors like infrastructure, education level 
and labour cost may drive investment decisions allocating efficiently capital across 
jurisdictions. MNEs headquartered in investment hubs (tax havens like Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Mauritius, Netherlands, and Singapore with inward investment above 150% of GDP68) should 
be mostly affected by the introduction of Pillar One and Pillar Two. 
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Figure 10. A case of reallocation of multinational profits 
2.5.1 Understanding the reallocation of profit under Pillar 1 
Professor Allison Christians has studied the 
OECD Unified Approach tax base 
redistribution mechanisms describing a 
scenario (Figure 8) in which a profitable 
multinational Group X is conducting 
activities which are affecting three 
jurisdictions: Jurisdiction 1 (J1), 
Jurisdiction 2 (J2), and Jurisdiction 3 (J3). 
Normally, under current rules, I could 
argue that Group X is present only in J1 and 
in J2. Group X is incorporated in J1, where 
there is the parent company P Co with 
headquarters, management and the IP. 
In J2 there is a subsidiary (PE) of Group X, 
Q Co, which claims about what its income is based on its functions (returns on sales marketing 
and distribution activities). The rest of the profit belongs to P Co (all the remaining returns 
including profits associated with high value IP and intangibles). So J1 and J2 share the profits 
of Group X and the way they allocate it between them is arms’ length rules. 
In J3, there is no allocation of Group X’s earnings under the arms’ length rules, there are only 
sales to J3 users or advertising to buyers in J3 for example. In J3 there is no PE. No traditional 
nexus. 
The OECD Pillar 1 aims to find a consensus based solution to allocate more tax base to J2 and 
J3. J2 has a bit of Group X’s profits related to marketing and distribution functions but it wants 
more because it is providing valuable market and users. The last thesis is sustained by J3 even 
if there is no PE. So in this scenario is J1 (U.S. and China for example) that is asked to renounce 
to a part of its tax base in favour of J2 (Canada and EU countries) and J3 (India and developing 
countries). 
Allison Christians, tax law professor at McGill University in Montreal, elaborated some 
calculations69on the basis of a recent KPMG transfer pricing study commissioned by 
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Source: Christians Allison, Taxation of the Digital Economy: 
Preliminary Analysis of OECD Pillar 1 Impact Assessment, 




Microsoft70 and the OECD economic analysis and impact assessment71, both of them published 
on February 2020. 
In brief, the author considered: 
• the made up case of Group X with a consolidate profit of $30 on $125 in worldwide 
sales (profit margin 24%);72 
• J1 sales revenues = $0, J2 sales revenues = $85, J3 sales revenues = $40; 
• the impact of Amount A using OECD’s deemed routine profit threshold of 20% (X), 
yielding a reminder of 80% nonroutine profit (Y);73 
• 20% of nonroutine profit (Y) redistributed among market countries (W);74 
• KPMG value-added return to marketing and distribution (Amount C) 3,6% of operating 
margin and limited risk return to marketing and distribution 2,5% of operating margin 
(Amount B).75 
Here are, in Figure 9, the interesting results founded which help to understand clearly how the 
tax base of J1, J2 and J3 are affected by the Unified Approach: 
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Without taking in consideration the Unified Approach, J1 is being assigned most of the Group’s 
profits, J2 where sales and marketing take place is being assigned some of the profit and J3 is 
buying the products (goods / services) and it is getting none of the profit. In J3 tax administrators 
can tax goods and services with the VAT but they are not getting a tax on the profit of the 
multinational. 
The result of the Unified Approach Pillar 1 is to take a little bit out of J1 and assign it to J2 and 
J3. But it is going to be a modest reallocation for J3 (developing countries).76 Professor Allison 
Christians sustains that, in plugging in the numbers and data that the OECD and the KPMG 
study proposed, the amount distributed in J3 is miniscule, it’s almost non existing. Applying 
assumptions and percentages utilized by OECD and KPMG there is not too much redistribution 
effect for developing countries.77 
According to this study there is an enforcement problem with the slice of Amount A ($1.54) in 
J3. There is Group X, neither resident nor physically present in J3, that is selling goods and 
services to customers in J3. 
There is no nexus (PE) in J3 according to current international taxation system. The only way 
for J3 to catch $1,54 Amount A is a withholding tax. Probably the taxpayer of the withholding 
tax is Q Co (subsidiary in J2) and not P Co (parent in J1). 
European Unilateral digital taxes are dealing with this problem: to collect digital taxes, national 
tax administrations are trying to designate an European withholder which is actually selling 
goods and services in their territory. European subsidiaries would be paying these taxes not 
their American parent companies. Where there is no subsidiary they are creating new laws to 
comply with but this is also creating issues. 
Quebec for example made a contract with non-residents companies like Airbnb and Netflix 
forcing them to withhold a tax which is a VAT on users in Quebec. These companies agreed 
because it isn’t a tax on their profits as they directly passed on this tax to their consumers. 
In the mentioned cases there is no tax treaty, all of them are unilateral domestic decisions that 
will probably trigger discrimination claims and litigations. 
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2.6 A critical analysis of the OECD Digital Taxation 
The OECD Unified Approach is proposing the allocation of taxing rights to Market States 
through new nexus alternatives: user participation, marketing intangibles, significant economic 
presence. The new nexus rules would coexist with current taxing rights and transfer pricing 
rules applicable to supply-side States and permanent establishments.  
A slice of income will be distributed by formula to most or all of the countries where the 
taxpayer has customers or make sales. The tax will be imposed on a taxpayer’s consolidated 
global operations. 
Everyone is welcoming changes to the century-old rules of the international tax systems, but at 
the same time, tax practitioners recognize that adjustments has to be performed with a clear 
understanding of why the long-standing tax principles are what they are. 
OECD Unified Approach represents a shock for international taxation principles relating to 
both nexus and income allocation. In fact, it is trying to solve structural problems in domestic 
and international tax law. The proposed new standards are completely unrelated to the 
permanent establishment concept or to the arm’s length principle. So it will be very difficult to 
implement “simplicity, stabilization of the tax system and increased tax certainty” for a long 
period.78 
There is one big problem in the method used by the OECD: determining the “right” amount of 
income to allocate to a particular jurisdiction is very difficult. Prof. David H. Rosenbloom 
sustains that a formulaic allocation of income will inevitably lead to inappropriate results and 
almost endless disputes. 
Pricing policies, for example Netflix subscription prices, may vary by country and a formulaic 
method for allocating and apportioning a company’s global profits ignores those variations in 
pricing models.79 
Under Pillar 1 is presenting three Amounts: A (pure formulaic reallocation), B (which is meant 
to approximate to arm’s length but is actually formulaic) and C (full transfer pricing). Well it’s 
perfectly possible that a company physically present in a country can be subject to amounts A, 
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B, and C at the same time. A company could be taxed on the same profits at least twice. There 
is a problem of potential overlapping that needs to be solved. But how that gets done is very 
unclear at the moment. All these complex interactions are coming together and there must be 
an international agreement on them. 
According to Michael Devereux the profit allocated to the destination countries should be 
deducted from taxable profit in some other countries to avoid double taxation problems. This 
would require determining the routine and residual profit in every country in which every 
multinational operates.80 
Another potential conceptual mistake could be considering the place where customers are 
located as a key indicator to assess where the value is created. It is not necessarily true and this 
idea has been rejected in the past by the policymakers. 
There are two unresolved questions the OECD is still debating: 
• the definition of digital services companies and their specificities/similarities that 
make them fall in the scope of the tax. Today all companies are becoming digital with 
a stable website and they engage with their customers through internet. 
There is low sensibility in applying an income tax on digital business models that are 
not relevantly different from many other business models. Most of the companies track 
customer preferences and their marketing accordingly. Pharmaceutical companies 
closely monitor their treatment results and IP is fundamental in that industry.81 So 
countries should know exactly how far the scope of the tax is going. At the moment 
seems that extractive industries, agricultural and industrial products will be exempted. 
• The determination of whether a business is consumer facing or not. There is no 
specified procedure to determine the nature of a company’s activities (segmentation by 
line of business or by region?). There are many companies wondering if they can be 
considered consumer facing or not. What about businesses that sell to both other 
businesses and to consumers? For example there could be a problem with an auto 
company which on one hand sells its cars to independent dealers which in turns sell to 
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consumers (this is consumer facing) and on the other it could sell its cars to leasing 
companies which provide fleet services for businesses (this is not consumer facing). So 
it could perfectly be that the same business must be segmented. The rationale at the 
moment is unknown. 
• whether it would be better to adopt a gross basis tax for digital companies rather than 
net-basis income tax. 
A tax on net income should include at the same time possible deductions, and for digital 
intangible companies, it will be not possible to have those deductions in market 
jurisdictions. The OECD hasn’t given instructions to deal with the administration of a 
net income tax on foreign taxpayers. Peter Barnes and David Rosenbloom believe that 
OECD justifications to introduce a new income tax are not strong enough to dismiss 
long-standing principles of international income tax administration. They argue that the 
better approach is to use gross-basis taxes such as those that have been adopted by 
countries imposing unilateral interim measures.82 
The OECD is presenting a proposal with untested complexities that may crate administrative 
challenges. Commentators are waiting for complete details83 regarding the economic impact 
analysis of the Two-Pillar Approach and they would like an holistic set of policy 
recommendations to reform corporate tax system without ring-fencing the digital economy.84 
The problem in considering the OECD DST is the big picture. First of all, taxation requires 
policies and ideas but also rules and rules require details. At the moment many commentators 
believe that there is chaos in the formulation of the OECD proposal. If there is a lack of clarity 
on basic principles amongst countries and businesses, then it will be very difficult to come out 
with detailed rules. There are very few specifications and indications on how the OECD Pillar 
1 has to be understood how much revenue digital taxes are collecting and how readily they can 
be administered. 
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As far as I have understood, in the OECD proposal, the problem is not identifying the companies 
falling under the scope of digital taxes, but identifying the tax due.  
Pillar 1 is reallocating income between countries and it is not cost free for them. It seems a 
comprehensive agreement could be found through a carefully articulated set of principles that 
covers classes of activity and income streams of the whole digitalizing economy rather than a 
limited and static selection of named sectors.85 
The OECD recently disclosed an Economic Analysis and an Impact Assessment to estimate the 
combined effect of Pillar One and Pillar Two. Commentators are challenging the reliability of 
these estimates which are relying on data of 2016 prior a lot of policy changes, including the 
U.S. TCJA.  
The United States are defending national companies from European countries willing to tax 
their digital giants. In June the U.S. withdrawal from OECD negotiations has created a big 
problem that could slow down the race towards a consensus based solution. 
Under Pillar One and Pillar Two there is still a lot of technical work to be done. But 
unfortunately technical work in this case is not really separated by political sustain and policy. 
Technical work at the OECD in fact needs regular direction from each member states’ 
politicians and institutions.86 
There is a basilar concerns regarding what is the minimum level of tax under Pillar Two. An 
open debate is going on because there could eventually be no consensus among European 
countries on the minimum level of taxation. EU has to operate under the fundamental freedoms 
rules and a minimum tax rate which is higher than the lowest rate in the EU (Hungary 9%87) 
could lead to tension in the system. 
            
85 Will Morris, INSIGHT: OECD Digital Tax Project: Profit Reallocation—How Do We Get ‘There’ From 
‘Here’?, Bloomberg Tax, Transfer Pricing Report, July 28, 2020. According to the author, in the U.S., both Obama 
and Trump Administrations have opposed a solution “ringfencing the U.S. tech sector” and it will not be sustained 
by legislators from both parties in the future. This article is suggesting that the OECD should focus its attention 
on classes of activities or income streams originated by “digitalizing activities”. 
86 For example, the definition of a “consumer facing business” might appear a technical issue, but because it has 
many implications to different countries and industries, it becomes a problem to be solved with political consensus. 
And what about whether Amount B is treated on a regional or industry basis? 
Then there are pure political issues such as the agreed formula for Amount A, the decision whether developing 
countries will prevail in their desire to have a subject to tax rule that has precedence in Pillar Two. 
87 Elke Asen, Corporate Income Tax Rates in Europe, Tax Foundation, April 16, 2020. “France has the highest 
statutory corporate income tax rate among European OECD countries, at 32 percent. Portugal and Germany follow, 
at 31.5 percent and 29.9 percent, respectively. Hungary (9 percent), Ireland (12.5 percent), and Lithuania (15 




So technical players at the International Framework are encountering problems with consensus 
and with an extraordinary ambitious timetable. This context has obviously been further 




2.7 The European Commission (EC) Digital Services Tax Proposal 
At Union level the challenges addressed by OECD BEPS Project were treated in the 
Communication of the Commission "A Fair and Efficient Tax System in the European Union 
for the Digital Single Market".88 
The Commission identified two problems. First, that current corporate tax rules do not capture 
properly profits generated by new digital companies’ business models. And second, that laws 
do not recognize value generated by users. In this way there is disconnection between where 
value is created and where taxes are paid. 
On 21 March 2018, the European Commission presented two legislative proposals to establish 
a new common system of a digital services tax: 
• a long term solution to reform corporate tax rules on nexus criteria; 
• a short term solution was an interim digital tax on turnover related to particular types of 
digital services provided. 
The long-term solution aimed to establish the concept of significant digital presence in a 
country, expanding the definition of the tax-treaty nexus rule: the permanent establishment 
requirement. This measure would have enabled member countries to tax non-resident 
companies with significant business activities in the state, regardless whether there is a physical 
presence or a dependent agent. 
The aim of the proposal was that of ensuring that online digital companies contribute to public 
finances at the same level of traditional “brick-and-mortar” companies.89 This was probably 
integrating the Commission’s proposal for a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
(CCCTB), which is aiming to build a single corporate tax system across the EU for digital 
companies, reducing compliance costs and making it harder to shift profits arbitrarily to low-
tax jurisdictions.90 
            
88 European Commission, A fair and efficient tax system in the European Union for the digital single market, 
COM, 547 September 21, 2017. This Communication has been of vital importance because the EU for the first 
time took a clear and strong position on taxing the digital economy. The EU had the great interest to continue to 
actively participate to global discussions on digital taxation with G20 and OECD countries. But, in absence of 
significant progress at the OECD level, a European Commission legislative proposal would have been ready to be 
implemented. 
89 European Commission, Digital Taxation: Commission proposes new measures to ensure that all companies pay 
fair tax in the EU, COM., March 21, 2018. 




The European Commission used proxies for determining the 'digital footprint' of a business in 
a jurisdiction based on certain indicators of economic activity.91  
A digital company would have a taxable significant digital presence or a virtual permanent 
establishment in a Member State if it meets one of the following thresholds: 
• the amount of digital services to users in a jurisdiction exceed € 7 million ($ 784 million) 
in a taxable year; 
• the number of users of a digital service in a Member State exceeds 100,000 in a tax 
period; 
• the number of business contracts for digital services exceeds 3 000.92 
The short term solution instead is about the introduction of an interim digital services tax that 
would generate immediate revenues for Member States. This tax would apply to revenues 
generated by companies: selling online advertising space, offering online marketplace 
connecting users, collecting-storing-processing-monetizing users’ information and data. 
The European Commission interim DST consists of a 3% turnover tax that would apply to 
companies with total annual worldwide revenues above €750 million (US $840 million) and 
EU annual taxable revenues above €50 million. 
The European Commission calculated that on average digital companies generate a profit 
margin around 15% and that the EU’s average corporate income tax rate is 21.3%, thus the 
proposed tax rate of 3% (3/15 = 20%).93 
There is no distinction between companies operating independently or part of a consolidated 
group. 
Of course, the first turnover threshold is so high that the tax would apply only to a small number 
of large companies. 
The approvement of this tax proposal needed the support of all 28 EU countries, including low-
tax country like Ireland. It was intended to be a “quick fix”, an interim measure until a broader 
            
91 European Commission, Proposal laying down rules relating to the corporate taxation of a significant digital 
presence, COM (2018) 147 final, March 21, 2018. Indicators of economic activity should reflect the link of digital 
business models with different level of user engagement, user’s contributions and reliance of these businesses on 
value created by users. 
92 Supra note 82, page 8. 
93 Papotti R., Cazeiro M., Analysing the Italian Digital Services Tax Through European Glasses, Tax Notes 
International, November 20, 2019. The rationale of the tax rate at 3% is related to European Commission’s aim to 




solution would have been found by OECD member states. Ireland and some other Nordic 
countries opposed and criticized it and therefore European Union finance ministers failed to 
agree on tax on digital revenues.94 
The EU is fully committed to provide full assistance in negotiations with the OECD to reach a 
consensus-based solution, but if no solution is found by the end of 2020, it will again make a 
proposal for its own digital tax.95 
At the moment it seems very difficult to find an immediate solution at both OECD and EU 
level, coordination requires time. So many Member States started introducing and designing 
their own digital taxes. 
I will now describe how the OECD is working and the nature of negotiations going on in the 
last public consultations of the IF member states. 
2.8 How the European Countries are moving on Digital Services Taxes 
European governments are aiming to tax American tech giants that supply internet search, 
online shopping and social media to their citizens. This can be interpreted as one of the largest 
economic battle of 2020 and for the upcoming years. 
Changing international rules on digital taxation it’s extremely difficult because attributing value 
to a user that accesses a free service is economically challenging as there is no price signal 
connected and treating a network of users as a value-creating asset raises many measurement 
and calculation difficulties.96 
Recently our economic activities have shifted even more to the virtual world: social distances 
and stay-at-home orders under Covid-19 led to a real business booming for tech companies like 
Amazon, Netflix and Zoom. 
Crash-crunched states are looking for new revenue sources: some European countries have 
already proposed or enacted digital taxes (even before the pandemic crisis), many others will 
            
94 Leigh Thomas, EU ministers fail to break digital tax deadlock, REUTERS, December 3, 2018. The author states 
that Ireland, like many other countries, has gained many benefits by letting multinationals to book, in their 
jurisdiction, profits on digital sales to customers located elsewhere in the European Union. 
95 See Marcin Szczepanski, Digital Taxation: State of play and way forward, European Parliament Think Tank, 
March 19, 2020; and Romano Beda, La Ue prova ad accelerare su web tax e tasse per la società, Il Sole 24 Ore, 
September 13, 2020. 




catch up. Social and welfare service cuts would deepen the recession and ideally digital taxes 
could help mitigate States’ revenue shortages.97 
Despite a constructive atmosphere at a OECD level, several European countries have decided 
to introduce their DSTs unilaterally after the failure to find a common solution by the European 
Commission and by the OECD. 
By issuing turnover taxes, they basically aim to reallocate to themselves income over which 
they ceded power jurisdiction in their tax treaties. 
Ireland and the Nordic countries are said to be against a common EU position because tax is a 
national competence. Larger member states (Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom) 
declared they want to take advantage of the existing momentum and conclude negotiations as 
soon as possible. 
            
97 Ruth Mason, Darien Shanske, INSIGHT: The Time Has Come for State Digital Taxes, Bloomberg Tax, Daily 
Tax Report: State, May 29, 2020. The author is underlying how digital taxes are becoming attractive for countries 
especially during this pandemic. Even the Maryland legislature recently adopted a digital advertising tax proposal. 
Source: KPMG, Taxation of the Digitalized Economy: Developments summary, 
September 8, 2020; and  Asen E., What European OECD Countries Are Doing 
about Digital Services Taxes, June 22, 2020. 




Up to now Austria, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Turkey and the UK have implemented their 
own national DSTs. 
Belgium, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Spain instead have published formal proposals to 
enact a DST. Latvia. Norway and Slovenia have showed intentions to implement such taxes.98 
European countries are required to offer detailed justifications for their DSTs. In fact, many 
non-digital companies are also expert in reducing their tax bill. They have to explain why digital 
firms like Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon are fundamentally different from non-digital 
firms like Goldman Sachs, Nike and Nestlé. Additionally turnover thresholds maybe should 
take into account the fact that the EU market has been reduced because of Brexit and that the 
United Kingdom has formulated its own version of DST. Probably they will have to expand the 
number of digital activities reducing the discriminatory aspects of the tax.99 
As of May 2020, also other twenty-two countries around the world have either enacted or 
proposed some form of DSTs: India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Kenya and Tunisia are part of this 
list.100 
2.8.1 USA vs Europe 
Before 2008 crisis, countries’ attitude towards corporate avoidance was one of indulgence. The 
United States has always been the biggest resident countries and before the 2017 tax reform the 
American corporate tax rate was very high 35%. This tax rate was applied to profits earned in 
the U.S. and to profits realized abroad remitted back in America as dividends. Foreign source 
income was exempted. 
American companies used to establish subsidiaries abroad (in Europe) and to transfer to those 
subsidiaries Intellectual Property (IP). At that time, under U.S. law, income generated by 
            
98 Elke Asen, What European OECD Countries Are Doing about Digital Services Taxes, TAX FOUNDATION, 
June 22, 2020. All these DSTs have different structures in term of tax base and tax rate and although they have 
been presented as interim measures it is not clear when they will be deactivated if an agreement is found at the 
OECD. 
99 Goulder Robert, After the Break Up: Can Europe Build a Better DST?, 98 Tax Notes Int’l, p. 1557, June 30, 
2020. The cited expectation might be the most important step. At the moment subscription fees (Spotify), video 
game developer in-app purchases (Supercell), digital platforms that facilitate financial trades or payments, 
European banks and payment services (Skrill), revenue from data obtained by sensors, connected cars (BMV, 
Volvo). 





foreign subsidiaries was deferred from U.S. tax until the subsidiary was distributing it in the 
form of dividends. Apple for example, could have deferred taxes as long as it wanted, 
potentially indefinitely. So corporate tax directors’ job was: shifting the IP out of America and 
then getting the income out of all other relatively high tax states into lowest tax subsidiaries 
(base erosion).101 
Additionally international coordination was missing with many gaps existing between different 
national tax system. For example the U.S. residence rule is place of incorporation, while the 
Irish tax residence rule is where a company id managed and controlled. 
So first of all, Apple incorporated companies in Ireland transferring IP abroad but these 
companies were managed and controlled from the U.S., thereby not having tax liability in either 
country.102 
Secondly Apple’s German subsidiaries (with high tax rates) were buying, for very high prices 
(enhancing deduction, avoiding to pay high taxes in Germany), phones from its Irish 
subsidiaries, because that has the effect of shifting income into Ireland (12,5% tax rate). 
So every country was focused on its own tax system and on its own taxpayers without 
considering the global overview of the situation. 
U.S. tax avoidance was a foreign tax avoidance (Apple was avoiding German taxes) and this 
dynamic actually made U.S. companies more competitive and U.S. shareholders richer. At the 
same time European countries welcomed investments, productive factors and jobs, tolerating a 
certain amount of income erosion.103 
After the 2008 crisis, countries started addressing tax planning problems because they were 
facing budgetary shortfalls. Politicians could no longer take this indulgent attitude towards 
corporate tax avoidance. They were looking for more tax. And ordinary people were feeling the 
pain of the crisis and they started to pretend corporations to pay their fair share of tax within 
countries where they were creating value and profit. And today it’s still the same. But what 
Apple was doing was perfectly legal and many other multinationals were taking advantages on 
international tax law gaps. 
            
101 See University of Virginia School of Law’s podcast “Taxing Big Tech and the Future of International Tax”, 
speaker Ruth Mason March 26, 2019. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FYAiOy9CovE. 
102 Ruth Mason, The Transformation of International Tax, American Journal of International Law, Virginia Public 
Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2020-36, Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 2020-08, 
April 15, 2020. 




The solution was proposed by the G20, tasking the OECD with the mandate of finding the gaps, 
closing them and reforming international tax system. Thanks to multilateral cooperation and 
the OECD work, many things have changed to stop BEPS. 
For example, Ireland was forced to change its tax residence rule and U.S., in 2017, implemented 
a minimum tax on U.S. companies foreign source income stopping deferral practices. 
Negotiations are going on at the OECD level with the International Framework discussing new 
nexus rules, how to grow the “revenue pie” by closing loopholes. Countries are disputing about 
where economic activity in the digital age is generated, where it should be taxed and who should 
collect that revenue. The United States are defending national companies from European 
countries willing to tax their digital giants. 
U.S. is supporting the change in the nexus rules enlarging the tax scope but they don’t want to 
have sectorial discrimination. 
These new rules should not apply only to particular kinds of companies (social media and digital 
companies), they should be collected also from a broader range of businesses. 
In this case, France has to collect tax from Facebook but U.S. should also get to collect tax from 
Gucci, that is marketing intangibles, trademarks, people’s good feelings about brands. These 
intangibles asset generate value for firms and they do really exist in the states where the 
consumers or user are. 
So in BEPS Project, Action 1, the United States could only loose because more tax is going to 
be assigned to market jurisdictions.104 The OECD is struggling to find a common solution under 
the Unified Approach because every country has its necessities and interests. 
Economic leaders are worried because if a resolution on digital tax or the global minimum tax 
is not reached this year, an international tax fight between the United States and Europe could 
represent a threat to the global economy. 
U.S. have the interest to prevent a proliferation of new digital taxes around the world and are 
pushing for a global tax regime. 
2.9 Key issues regarding the legality of Digital Taxes in Europe 
The short term solution, the Digital Services Tax (DST), to tax our modern digital economy is 
widely criticized. Legal experts and researchers sustain that digital taxes are bringing some 
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problem like: discrimination against particular sectors and countries, tariff consequences, 
double taxation, retaliation and additional costs for consumers. 
In fact, the DST represents an interim measure until the OECD can find a better solution to the 
challenges of taxing an increasingly digitalized economy. Many think that this temporary 
stopgap could be dangerous because it contains no end date and could potentially last 
indefinitely. 
From a legal point of view, EU taxpayers could argue that digital services taxes, as they are 
formulated today, may lead to violations of EU law. 
Both EU proposal and unilateral digital taxes may violate European laws prohibiting nationality 
discrimination and unilateral measures could implicate violations is state aid rules.105 
High revenues thresholds grant that only very large companies are subject to digital taxes, and 
therefore this means that almost only foreign companies would pay digital taxes in Europe. 
Additionally their narrow scope impose taxation only for specific disfavoured sectors. 
In their legal argumentation, R. Mason and L. Parada consider the proper role discriminatory 
intent should play in fundamental freedoms cases, describing the evidence that EU Member 
States enacted digital taxes to discriminate against big, foreign companies, and especially 
against U.S.-headquartered digital giants.106 
2.9.1 Potential discrimination claims 
Revenue triggers are very high and they apparently seem to be neutral when in reality they 
guarantee that digital taxes will fall almost entirely on U.S.-headquartered companies. This fact 
could be interpreted as nationality discrimination. 
Under the EU law, the fundamental freedoms ensure that goods, services, capital and persons 
can move without restrictions. 
            
105 Ruth Mason & Leopoldo Parada, Digital Battlefront in the Tax Wars, Tax Notes International, December 17, 
2018. In this article, the authors explain how revenue thresholds in proposed DSTs (EU and national) are exposed 
to nationality discrimination claims (only non-resident companies would be affected), state aid violations (ring-
fencing big tech companies). 
106 Ruth Mason & Leopoldo Parada, The Legality of Digital Taxes in Europe, University of Virginia School of 
Law, April 2020. In some cases the legislative discriminatory intent is explicit and evident, in some other (the 




In Europe, U.S. companies get protection under the freedom of movement of capital and not 
under the freedom of establishment. 
Only a EU plaintiff could bring a claim under the fundamental freedoms against a unilateral 
DST. This fact does not represent a problem because, in most cases, American companies 
operate in Europe through subsidiaries. They would argue that the state discriminates against 
them by virtue of their foreign parentage.107 
The point here is understanding whether this argumentation can be sustained also against the 
EU directive. For sure a taxpayer is more likely to be successful challenging national digital 
taxes. 
There are three main potential discrimination argumentations: 
1) Group membership: digital taxes can discriminate against groups in comparison with 
standalone companies because, for example, both UK and the French DTSs determine the 
entity’s liability for the tax on the entire group’s global revenue rather than in-state revenue. 
Therefore multinationals are more likely to be taxed because for stand-alone companies 
only its own revenue counts toward the revenue trigger. Additionally they will be much 
more involved in cross-border provision of services, an activity protected by fundamental 
freedoms.108 
2) Foreign Parentage: Member States can discriminate applying their unilateral digital taxes 
excessively against domestic companies with parents in other member states. There is no 
discrimination issue for non-EU-parents. 
3) Size: applying so high revenue thresholds member states will discriminate because they will 
have few or no domestic companies that would meet these thresholds. Usually taxes that 
exclusively hit non-resident companies while exempting domestic companies represent the 
case for covert nationality discrimination.109 
            
107 Ruth Mason & Leopoldo Parada, Digital Battlefront in the Tax Wars, Tax Notes International, December 17, 
2018. Supra note 65. “For example, while U.S.-incorporated Apple Inc. would lack standing to bring a claim 
against, say, France for discrimination, one of its Irish subsidiaries with activities in France that are taxable under 
a unilateral French digital tax would have standing to bring a nationality discrimination claim against France”. 
108 Ruth Mason & Leopoldo Parada, The Legality of Digital Taxes in Europe, University of Virginia School of 
Law, April 2020. 
109 See: Ruth Mason & Leopoldo Parada, Company Size Matters, British Tax Review, Issue 5, 610, 615-618, 2019; 
and European Court Reports, Humblot v. Directeur des services fiscaux, C-112/84, CJEU 1985: an interesting case 




With such high DST’s revenues triggers, most of the liable companies would be foreign and 
almost all of them would be foreign-parented. But if those foreign taxpayers (or their 
parents) are located in EU states, then their disproportionate taxation may violate the 
fundamental freedoms. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) could favour 
the pursuit of the public policy goal related to taxation based on the ability to pay and 
progressivity. But in this case, this goal could be reached by taking in consideration 
companies’ net income, which would tend to correlate with size. The problem is that current 
unilateral digital taxes are setting their thresholds on corporate turnover. For sure both net 
income and turnover could discriminate by size but at least the former measures ability to 
pay fare better. 
Additionally DST’s thresholds do not directly or indirectly measures a company’s network 
effects, exploitation of big data, or amount of user input.110 They have no proportionality 
justifications and, at the moment, they are really poorly supported by the Commission or 
any member state. 
Even if the EU digital tax proposal wasn’t approved with a unanimous vote, its thresholds were 
taken in consideration in determining the taxable base of many unilateral DTSs. 
2.9.2 State Aid Violations 
Unilateral digital taxes could face state aid challenges because they select on the basis of size, 
nationality and sector. They could be conceived as sectoral state aid to smaller, domestic 
competitors of foreign large multinationals. Taxpayers could challenge the European member 
state protectionist aim in drafting the structure of its unilateral digital tax. 
As regard the state aid granted by a member state through digital taxes, there is one relevant 
thing that every European taxpayer should keep in mind: state aid investigation can be 
performed only by the Commission and it is unclear whether the commission would do so. 
Probably, it will be very difficult that the European Commission will challenge unilateral 
member state rules shaped an designed on the Commission’s own DTS proposal.111 
            
110 Ruth Mason & Leopoldo Parada, Digital Battlefront in the Tax Wars, Tax Notes International, December 17, 
2018. The European Commission is supporting thresholds that could be offered as justifications for 
disproportionate effects on non-resident companies.  
111 Ruth Mason & Leopoldo Parada, Digital Battlefront in the Tax Wars, Tax Notes International, December 17, 
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2.9.3 The Legal Relevance of Intent 
Being involved facially neutral rules, the CJEU should take into account legislators and 
government officials intent to discriminate (indirect discrimination). 
In the case Vodafone Magyarország112 (Vodafone Hungary) EU Advocate General Julian 
Kokott expresses a novel reference to the use of legislative intent in determining the existence 
of indirect discrimination. 
In July 2019, Leopoldo Parada studied this case and the Advocate General’s opinions 
underlying the EU principle of prohibition of abuse of rights applied to European member 
states. The author mentioned how each member state has the obligation to comply and respect 
EU law and if it intentionally chooses to introduce a turnover-based tax to disadvantage foreign 
companies (therefore restricting the freedom of establishment), for example, this decision 
would amount to an abuse of rights.113 
Discriminatory intent is not wholly irrelevant in fundamental-freedoms cases but sometimes it 
is really difficult to prove legislative intent. No government, in fact, would explicitly declare 
within the law that its intention is to disadvantage a group of foreign taxable persons. 
The intention must be legally relevant and must have been accordingly proven. Most of the time 
is almost impossible to provide with clear evidence of the legislator’s primary purpose to 
disadvantage foreign companies. 
To this end the statements of the political representatives of the government should be 
considered insufficient to establish intent? Or must there be an official document written and 
signed by a member state containing evidence that the primary objective is that of 
discriminating against foreign-parented companies? 
If legislative intent will be taken in consideration in future State-aid cases, as in Gibraltar 
case114, then the CJEU might consider digital services taxes as State aid.115 
            
112 See Parada Leopoldo, How the Vodafone Magyarország Opinion Affects EU Debate on Turnover-Based Digital 
Taxes, 95 Tax Notes Int'l 5, July 29, 2019. 
113 Parada Leopoldo, How the Vodafone Magyarország Opinion Affects EU Debate on Turnover-Based Digital 
Taxes, 95 Tax Notes Int'l 5, July 29, 2019. It cannot be a mere coincidence that digital services tax proposed by 
European countries discriminate against U.S. companies. The problem with discriminating American companies 
is that it also bring within-EU discrimination because the EU subsidiaries of those American companies are located 
in tech-friendly, lower-tax European states. 
114 See: Commission v. Gibraltar and United Kingdom, joined cases C-106/09 P and C-107/09 P, CJEU 2011. 





2.9.4 Proportionality analysis 
The amount of the digital tax, its gross basis, the revenue thresholds, and the highly selective 
revenue streams to which it applies, would all face close scrutiny under proportionality 
analysis.116 
To accept a new tax, it must be no more discriminatory than necessary to realize the 
government’s legitimate goal. If less discriminatory approaches could be applied to achieve 
state’s ability to pay goals (public policy reasons justification), then that discrimination is not 
justified because the rule is not proportional. 
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2.10 The relevance of recent decisions by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union on Digital Taxes 
In early March 2020, The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) rendered its 
judgement in two cases that may influence challenges to unilateral digital taxes.117 
In these cases, two different UK-headquartered companies, Vodafone118 and Tesco119, brought 
nationality discrimination claims against the Hungarian “special tax” on net turnover from retail 
and telecommunications activities. 
Business in the lowest bracket were Hungarian-owned, while all (or nearly all) the companies 
in the highest bracket were foreign-owned. It was a net turnover tax and higher net turnover 
companies tended to be foreign. 
Tesco and Vodafone’s subsidiaries made the same claim in the same Hungarian national courts. 
In their opinion the Hungarian “special tax” was disproportionately hitting foreign owned 
companies and therefore it illegally discriminated against them. 
The two subsidiaries in question were claiming that although Hungary was not overtly 
discriminating on the basis of nationality, Hungarian national “special tax” was structured using 
proxy classification that highly correlated with nationality (disproportionate impact case). In 
this case, Hungary used a facially neutral law to effectuate intentional discrimination against 
foreign owned companies. 
In a precedent case, Hervis120, and Australian-parented company, challenged Hungary’s 
rationale to determine the graduated-rate that would apply under a special tax. 
Under the law, a Hungarian company had to consolidate its own turnover at a corporate level 
with those of other members (also foreign members) of the group to determine its tax rate. As 
a consequence, group members were subject to higher tax rates than non-group members. 
            
117 See: Ruth Mason, What the CJEU’s Hungarian Cases Mean for Digital Taxes, Tax Notes International, p. 161, 
April 13, 2020; and KPMG, CJEU decisions on progressive tax on turnover and fines related to advertising tax, 
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119 For an in-depth analysis see: Judgement of the Court, Tesco-Global Áruházak Zrt. v. Nemzeti Adó- és 
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120 See: Ruth Mason, What the CJEU’s Hungarian Cases Mean for Digital Taxes, Tax Notes International, p. 161, 




In this case, the Court established a simple majority rule: if most of the tax payers subject to 
disproportionate tax treatment were resident in other EU state or were linked to other EU 
companies, then the challenged specific national tax would have been considered illegally 
discriminatory under the fundamental freedoms. 
This judgement was extremely positive for taxpayers challenging the Hungarian special tax. 
Although, 
• fundamental freedoms (movement of capital, services, establishment, workers) 
doctrine; 
• the majority rule expressed and sustained in Hervis case; 
• article 110 on the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union prohibiting the 
member state imposition of protectionist taxes on goods to preserve internal market (for 
example in Humblot case121); 
• state aid doctrine showing what does it mean for a state to discriminate against cross-
border commerce relative to domestic commerce;122 
• Advocate General Juliane Kokott’s opinions analysing the possibility that Hungary 
enacted the tax with discriminatory intent but at the same time extensively briefing the 
Court on related DST issues;123 
the CJEU didn’t refer to its relevant precedent doctrine (Hervis, Humblot, Gibraltar 124…) nor 
it performed a proportionality analysis in Tesco and Vodafone cases. 
It considered the main question to be related to progressive taxation without taking in 
consideration covert discrimination (proxies facially neutral) or Hungary’s discriminatory 
intent in formulating the “special tax”. 
            
121 See: European Court Reports, Humblot v. Directeur des services fiscaux, C-112/84, CJEU 1985. 
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The Court declared, unsurprisingly, that progressive tax rates are not, by themselves, illegal.125 
By looking at these cases, one can reasonably assume that CJEU will not sustain future digital 
tax challenges raised by taxpayers. These cases in fact, present taxes whose nature, object of 
dispute, presents many similarities with the digital tax. 
Obviously, Digital Services Taxes are different from the Hungarian “special tax” challenged by 
Vodafone and Tesco, for example. DSTs hit specific sectors combining non-suspect 
classification (gross turnover) with some suspect classification (narrow streams of income). 
They tax gross, rather than net, income and their rate are determined by worldwide income. 
But for certain aspects, their extremely high turnover, exempting domestic competitors, make 
digital taxes even more discriminatory. 
Tesco and Vodafone sentences introduced legal uncertainty126 into fundamental freedoms 
doctrine and they may have strengthened the ability of EU to discriminate against U.S. 
companies. But at the same time, they also enhanced member’s ability to discriminate against 
companies resident in other EU states: a bad consequence for the European single market. 
Probably the CJEU will reject challenges to digital taxes ignoring the possible intentional 
discrimination against out-of-state companies undermining the European solidarity.127 
For the moment only assumptions can be made because there are simply not enough cases to 
sustain confident conclusions and the CJEU’s reasoning demonstrated to be inconsistent in the 
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The implementation of the Italian Digital Tax 
3.1 The long course of the Italian Digital Tax implementation 
Italy has always been looking for solutions to reduce a dramatic public debt and indeed Italy 
was one of the first countries to think about taxing the digital economy with sector-specific tax. 
Up to now, is almost seven years that Italian politicians are trying to introduce a digital tax 
which, through the years, was repeatedly named by Italian press as “Google Tax” or “Web 
Tax”. 
Aggressive, systematic and comprehensive tax audits have been initiated, amongst others, 
against Apple, Google and Amazon; all three led to expensive settlement agreements with the 
Italian tax authorities.128In 2015, for example, Google has agreed to pay € 306 million to settle 
a tax dispute with Italy for its operations in the country from 2002 to 2015; in the same year 
Apple paid Italy € 314 million in back taxes.129 
3.1.1 Italy’s 2013 Web Tax 
In 2013, under the Letta’s Government, Italy developed a study to address this problem and 
proposed the possible introduction of a “Web Tax” through an amendment to the Italian Budget 
Law for 2014.130 It was approved unanimously by the Budget Committee and published in the 
Official Gazette. 
In this law the Italian legislator introduced some rules about advertisement services taxation 
under VAT legislation and some specifications on direct taxation and transfer pricing related 
issues.131 
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The “Web Tax” amendment was containing two provisions: one looking to expanding the 
concept of “permanent establishment” to the transmission of data along Italy’s network 
infrastructures; and one studying how to calculate corporate income for online advertising 
market players whose transactions were taking place with related companies based in Italy. 
Mainly it was forcing non-Italian digital companies offering online advertising to get an Italian 
VAT number to sell their services to Italian-based clients (B2B).132 
At that time, this proposal was the first of its kind in Europe and it was sustained by deputy 
Francesco Boccia, who was then chairman of the House Budget Committee and an influential 
lawmaker form the main centre-left Democratic Party: Partito Democratico. 
In his opinion, this “Web Tax” would have brought between 100 million and 150 million euros 
a year. This “Google Tax” immediately triggered numerous debates on its capacity to 
effectively fight taxable profits erosion strategies. 
There was no issue regarding VAT avoidance in the digital economy. The VAT registration 
was just a mechanism to push multinational tech giants to register in Italy. In this way, “Web 
Tax” supporters were hoping to capture a much larger share of their taxable income. 
Forbes defined the approach of the Italian “Google Tax” simply illegal inside the European 
Union because of the Single Market fundamental freedoms (free movement of goods, services, 
people and capital and also the freedom of establishment). 
Two fierce Forbes articles judged Italian politicians as ignorant or opportunists seeking 
immediate political gains through illegal ideas.133 
Also the European Commission expressed serious doubt about the measure, potentially 
dangerous for the European taxation system and in contrast with EU fundamental freedoms and 
non-discrimination principles, because it was preventing Italian companies from acquiring 
services from companies registered in other European countries.134 Even if it wasn’t forcing 
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foreign-based online service providers to register in Italy, it was discouraging Italian companies 
to do business with foreigners. 
Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta, justified the proposal by saying that a coordination with 
the European norms was needed and that the project was still at the beginning, setting this 
“issue” as an absolute priority for Europe. 
This law would have entered into force by the 1st January 2014, but at first it was postponed to 
1st July 2014 and then it was definitively abrogated by the Decree Law 6 March 2014, n. 16 
wanted by the then Prime Minister Matteo Renzi. 
3.1.2 The 2015 Web Tax 
In 2015, few months after, a new version of the Italian Web Tax was re-proposed and 
formulated by Enrico Zanetti, the Economy and Finance undersecretary of Renzi’s 
Government. 
This time, the tax would have hit both Italian and foreign companies on the basis of two 
requirements: 
• having a continued online presence in the Italy of at least six months (this was another 
proposal to extend the concept of permanent establishment in comparison to that 
expressed by international tax law); 
• realizing at least EUR 5 000 000 million from Italian customers. 
A tax rate of 25% was fixed on these revenues.135 
Since the beginning also this web tax proposal seemed to have the aim of putting pressure on 
EU institutions to address the tax elusion by the main digital players. When Renzi’s 
Government came to an end in 2016, this proposal died with it. 
3.1.3 The “Transitional” 2017 Web Tax 
However the idea about the introduction of a “Google Tax” didn’t die in Italian lawmakers’ 
mind. In fact, towards the end of 2017 a new version of the Web Tax was introduced through a 
new amendment in the Budget Law 2018.136 
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This new proposal would have been defined the “Transitional Web Tax” because it introduced 
a voluntary disclosure regime, aiming to define targeted procedures instead of new taxes.137 
This version of the Web Tax targeted digital transactions with the following three 
characteristics: 
• an online electronic delivery of services; 
• any company regardless of their nationality: Italian residents or Italian Pes of non-
residents with business income; and 
• a volume above 3,000 transactions for a specific service provider/taxpayer within a 
given calendar year.138 
The first condition was targeting the automated supply of services via electronic means. The 
second one was imposing the tax only to B2B transactions (e-commerce supply of goods / B2C 
transactions were excluded) and the last threshold of 3,000 transactions was delimiting the 
scope of the tax only to big companies realizing significant income from digital business 
activities and exempting start-ups and small companies. 
If these three requirements were met, the Web Tax would have applied at a 3% on the service 
fee charged. This tax was withhold by the recipient of the service at the time of the payment 
and. 
Additional legislations was needed to detail the application of these provisions as regard the 
nature of  services falling within the scope of the web tax and obligations in relation to a tax 
declaration and payment of the tax. 
This version of the web tax was restricted to the automated supply of services and didn’t apply 
to e-commerce. Furthermore the web tax burdens non-residents and residents equally, including 
persons taxable in Italy on their worldwide income.139 
Further issuance of legislation was needed to better clarify services falling within the scope, 
obligations related to tax declarations and tax payments. 
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In the end the Ministry of Economy and Finance failed to publish the implementing law and so 
this proposal was never actually applied. 
3.1.4 The Italian Digital Services Tax (DST) 
The Italian Budget Law for 2019 introduced on 1 January 2019 the Digital Services Tax (DTS) 
in Italy.140 
This time, this proposal mirrored the EU Commission guidelines on the common system of 
digital services tax expressed in March 2018 and formed the basis of the current Italian DST. 
This umpteenth edition of the tax on digital economy, so desired by Italy, replaced the previous 
measures presented by the Budget Law 2018 regarding the “Web Tax”, never entered into force 
due to the lack of enactment of the implementing decree.141 
The 2019 Budget Law imposed a 3% Italian DST on taxable persons carrying on business-to-
business or business-to-consumer commerce and meeting, individually or jointly as part of an 
international group, both of the following conditions in the same taxable year: 
• total worldwide revenues exceeding € 750 million (same threshold expressed by the EU 
Commission); 
• total “digital” revenues generated in the Italian territory above € 5.5 million. 
In line with the European proposal, this tax was hitting taxable revenues generated by 
companies: 
• selling online advertising space on digital platforms (Digital Advertising); 
• offering a multi-sided digital interface / online marketplace connecting users and 
facilitating their market exchanges (Sharing Economy); 
• collecting-storing-processing-monetizing users’ information and data (Data 
Transmission).142 
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Even in this case, the 2019 Law defined general principles of application and needed a 
Ministerial Decree to be issued within May 2019. The Decree was never adopted by the 
Government and the tax never came into force. 
However the Italian Budget Law for 2020143 aims at reshaping once more the Italian DST 
including additional amendments. 
This proposal should enter into force starting from 1 January 2020 without the need for any 
ministerial implementing decree and it should be repealed once the OECD implements an 
agreed long-term solution – “sunset clause”.144  
The Budget Law for 2020 is using the same criteria and thresholds of Budget Law for 2019 to 
define the scope and taxable persons. 
Intragroup digital services exchanges and dealings are not relevant for DST purposes if one 
company is the controller of the other or if they have the same controlling entity. 
Additionally the new Italian proposal is introducing a number of exclusions to align the Italian 
DST to the European DST, even if the Italian list of exemptions, contained in Article 37-bis, is 
longer and more detailed than the European list. 
The following digital services are excluded from the scope of Italian DST: 
• supply of goods or services directly between users through an interface offering a digital 
intermediation service; 
• supply of goods and services that are acquired online through the website of the supplier 
and where the supplier does not act as an intermediary; 
• provision of a digital interface whose exclusive or primary purpose is providing the 
users of the interface with digital content, communication services or payment 
services;145 
• the management of digitalized interfaces and platforms delivering banking and financial 
services, exchange of electric energy, gas, environmental certificates and fuel as well as 
the transmission of the related collected data.146 
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All these categories are exempted because they generally have a minor contribution of the users 
to the process of value creation. DSTs are intended to tax business that are largely reliant on 
user value creation. 
User interaction is the value creator. Italian DST targets total gross revenues realized by 
provision of digital service to users located in Italy, net of value-added tax (VAT) or other 
indirect taxes. The geographical scope of taxable digital services is determined in the same 
manner by both the Italian and the European proposals. 
Users are deemed to be located in the Italian territory by reference to the internet protocol (IP) 
address of their device or any other method of geolocation, in compliance with data privacy 
regulations, at the time of their access to a digital interface or finalization of underlying 
transactions on that platform or opening of an account. 
So taxable persons have to know and monitor the location of their users for Italian DST 
purposes. 
Italian DST should be paid by February 16 of the taxable year following the one in which 
taxable revenues are realized (2021, for taxable revenues realized in year 2020) and the related 
tax return shall be filed by March 31 of the same year (2020). At the moment the effects of the 
Italian DST are still quite uncertain. 
The Italian Government is expecting to collect around € 708 million per year from the DST. 
These forecasts appear to be too much optimistic as the French Government which is relying 
on a more developed national digital infrastructure is prospecting to rise only € 500 million 
from French DST. 
Non-residents taxable persons with no permanent establishment inside the Italian territory and 
without a VAT identification number should request to Italian tax authorities an identification 
number for DST purposes. 
Non-UE subjects without a PE, which are resident in a State that has not concluded with Italy 
a convention on tax cooperation, must appoint also a tax representative in charge of carrying 
out the necessary tax reporting and related payment obligations to the Italian digital tax.147 
  
            




3.2 A critical analysis of the Italian DST 
There are several question marks in relation to the services included and the calculation of the 
Italian Digital Services Tax. 
First of all, I need to underline the fact that the Italian DST will apply on revenues realized by 
certain digital business only. The OECD’s approach instead in dealing with the allocation of 
profits/losses and is targeting a larger number of businesses. 
The Italian DST is based on the concept expressed by the EU Proposal of “value creation” and 
it has the aim to solve the “misalignment between the place where profits are taxed and the 
place where the value is created, notably in the case of business models heavily reliant on user 
participation”. The point is that the value for digital firms arises from the combination of users 
data and many other factors like capital, labour, technology. Usually a state’s tax base is over 
inclusive, reflecting large part of the chain of value that might not be linked to its territory. It is 
very hard to assess what is the real value generated only by customers and users.148 
The application of the Italian DST is rising some issues regarding the tax’s economic and legal 
implications. From an economic point pf view, applying DST to gross revenues means that a 
taxable person have to pay the Italian DST regardless of its marginal profits or whether it has 
made any profits. But digital companies are not necessarily profit-making. Additionally, the 
settlement of very high revenues thresholds does not grant that the tax complies with the ability-
to-pay principle laid out in the Italian Constitution.149 
Turnover taxes do not consider expenses. European VAT is a turnover tax but it compensate 
for that by granting the right of deduction. The Italian DST instead does not. The digital tax is 
not structured to be borne by final consumers, it should be paid by service providers only. It is 
not a consumption tax or an income tax. 
Italian DST can be seen as a non-deductible cost that may generate the cascading effect: this 
tax is applied many times along a supply chain, and since it is not deductible from the tax due, 
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the DST will become a business cost and therefore will shift the burden to final consumers. The 
mechanism could potentially generate distortive effects. 
Italian DST could trigger also possible cases of double taxation where profits deriving from 
revenues subject to Italian DST are also subject to corporate income tax. At the moment the 
Italian DST seems to be not creditable against corporate income tax. In this case a resident 
taxpayer selling digital services in Italy will be taxed twice on the same business (DST + 
corporate income tax). The DST is likely not a “tax covered” by the most relevant tax treaties 
and it can be challenged under non-discrimination clauses. The unique solution could be 
represented by a multilateral OECD solution. 
Terms “group” and “digital interface” should be clearly define by Italian tax authorities. 
The Italian DST may violate the EU fundamental freedoms because they may constitute de fact 
/ covert nationality discrimination under Article 107 of the TFEU. In fact, because of its high 
revenue triggers, it would apply only to very large foreign companies exempting domestic ones. 
EU states can discriminate against U.S. companies in many circumstances, but they are not 
allowed to discriminate against EU subsidiaries of U.S. companies.150 
Italian DST could also face state aid (illegal subsidy) challenges, because it is selective on the 
basis of size, nationality and sector, including that they target certain kinds of digital revenue 
for taxation and not all of them. 
Another relevant aspect is concerning the subject that will actually pay digital taxes, bearing 
the economic incidence: if companies react to digital taxes as they do with sales taxes, then 
some part of the tax likely will be passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices. In this 
way online subscriptions and advertised products will become more expensive.151 
The Italian DST is defining in Article 37 mainly three types of taxable digital services (digital 
advertising – sharing economy – data transmission) and at the same time it is providing, in 
Article 37-bis, a list of several exemptions. At the moment there is no guidance on how to deal 
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with bundled services that contains some service described in Article 37 and at the same time 
some features contained in Article 37-bis. The EU proposal is also silent on this point.152 
Multi-sided digital interfaces users’ identification and localization can rise some problems in 
terms of double taxation. In this context, “user” could be both the buyer and the seller of the 
goods and services exchanged on the digital interface. 
It’s not clear what is happening when the supplier and the recipient of the goods and services 
are located in two different states each of them with their own DST rules. And if the provider 
and the recipient are located in Italy, the underlying transaction would be included twice in the 
calculations?? 
Also on this aspect is missing a clear definition of “user” and this uncertainty is clearly bringing 
double taxation issues to be discussed.  
There is another distinction between the European DST Proposal and the Italian DST in 
determining the total amount of revenues related to advertising displayed on user’s device. The 
first one is taking as reference the number of times the advert has been displayed on user’s 
device in the fiscal year. The second one instead is counting how many times adverts are 
browsed on the digital interface when the use is located in Italy.153 
If users are consumers, then users’ jurisdiction are market jurisdictions. The idea that the market 
jurisdictions have the right to tax revenues of services providers just because they offer a sales 
market is not justified by the benefit principle. The value production that exploit the 
infrastructure of a given country occurs where the income-producing activities are performed 
and not where users are located. 
The supply of digital services through digital platforms may be understood as an activity carried 
out through a virtual PE with users’ contributions playing a critical role in value creation. In 
this case the users’ jurisdictions can be seen as traditional source countries and customers can 
become “unconscious providers of significant assets for a business rather than merely 
consuming its products.154 
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Petruzzi and Buriak sustain that data are real valuable assets especially for highly digitalized 
businesses that transfer, purchase, sell, process and transform data.155 I am referring to business 
models that offer customized products following the information acquired form big data for 
example. 
Digital companies would have the responsibility to geo-localise their Italian users and to 
disclaim whether revenues from digital services are generated from transactions with local 
users. This enforcement of data collection could trigger privacy-related issues in cases where 
users do not want to be tracked. 
Italian DST runs the risk of jeopardizing international trade agreements and triggering 
retaliatory measures. Additionally it is considered a temporary measure until a global and 
structured international agreement is not found. There is a “sunset clause” included in the 
enacting provision that would repeal the Italian unilateral measure once a comprehensive 
solution to the taxation of the digital economy is internationally reached. This “repealing 
clause” is vaguely determined and can be considered as a political commitment rather than a 
juridical norm.156 On this aspect the Italian law rises significant doubts because in the future a 
political commitment might be disregarded especially in a historical period of great 
governmental instability. 
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3.3 A comparison between the Italian DST version and the OECD’s 
proposals 
Even if the OECD two-pillar proposal and Italian DST are differently addressing the digital 
taxation, they present some commonalities. 
Both of the discussed proposals would lead to a dramatic change in international tax architecture 
fundamentals, both of them are trying to provide solutions that go beyond the arm’s length 
principle and beyond actual limitations on taxing rights determined by reference to a physical 
presence. 
Those proposals are representing a clear shift away from traditional transfer pricing rules based 
on facts, circumstances and physical assets to a much simpler use of proxies for allocating 
profits. They are also struggling to increase transparency around the amount of taxes that big 
digital multinationals are paying. 
They both share a key problem in responses to the following questions: “are you trying to 
change rules for just a few digital companies or should you make broad structural changes that 
affect all companies that have digitalized business models?” 
The answer is that they are taking two different approaches (multilateral vs unilateral) to 
structure proposals sharing the same fundamental problem: they target just large businesses and 
only certain type of activities. This is a big issue because tax policy should not be designed on 
an industry by industry basis or with special rules for big versus small players. 
Well, the Italian DST (as well as other DSTs in Europe) takes the narrower approach. It is a tax 
on gross revenues of specifically defined digital services: companies providing digital interface 
or advertising services based on users data. 
The OECD Pillar One approach would change where businesses pay taxes but only for large 
highly profitable companies operating in the following sectors: automated digital services and 
consumer facing businesses. 
As I said before the OECD two-pillars approach is radically different from that of Italian DST. 
The OECD is trying to find a consensus based long term solution with at least 137 countries 
around the globe, whereas Italy is adopting a unilateral interim measure that will expire when 
a global agreement will be reached at an international level. 
The OECD is focused on changing tax rules to allow countries to tax the income of digital 




ensuring a minimum level of corporate taxation. The DST is unilaterally ensuring that tech 
giants will be paying their fair share of taxes where value is created to national tax 
administrations. 
OECD is playing at an international level addressing Action 1 of the BEPS Project, while DST 
would be a domestic provision. Therefore the OECD’s uniform approach needs a political 
sustain because in a later moment its decisions have to be enacted into domestic law by each 
country. Unilateral digital taxes are immediately implemented into the domestic law, this is the 
reason why there is the high risk of a potential trade war among states. 
The reality is that policymakers are radically change how businesses are taxed. Under the 
current regime, companies can choose which jurisdiction they are going to locate in, and taxing 
rights follow these decisions. Big multinationals operating in the digital sector are against the 
implementation of DSTs targeting mainly non-resident taxpayers. 
Tech giants defend themselves by sustaining that, if any country can reach outside its borders 
and tax a company that hasn’t chosen to locate there with plants, properties and something 
physical, there is the potential risk of creating a system in which businesses could be 
theoretically liable for taxes in every single country because a user for example has access to a 
website. 
In the following table I will try to compare at my best the international OECD proposals and 
the domestic Italian version of digital taxation. 
   
Institution OECD – Inclusive Framework EU Commission - Italy 
Project 
G20/OECD BEPS Project, Action 1 
Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation 
Italian Budget Law for 2020 
Level  International Domestic 
Approach Multilateral Unilateral 
Proposals 
Pillar 1 – Unified Approach 
Pillar 2 – GloBE Proposal 
Italian Digital Services Tax (DST) 
Objectives 
Consensus-based solutions on: 
- new profit allocation and nexus rules; 
- minimum level of tax worldwide 
Force digital companies to pay 





Common agreement by the end of 2020 
15-16 October 2020 (G20 Finance Ministers meeting) 
21-22 November 2020 (G20 Leaders’ summit) 
It will enter into force in 2021 if an 
international agreement will not be 




$ 100 billion per year 
Italian Government Assessment: 
€ 708 million per year 
Problems & 
Risks 
- Complexity (Amounts A,B,C) 
- Double taxation 
- It is ring-fencing the digital economy 
- Lack of data, details, political sustain and 
coordination 
- Unclear definitions of: digital service companies, 
consumer facing businesses, thresholds to be used 
- Huge technical work in limited time 
- International pressure to build consensus on a new 
international tax order without an adequate level of 
collaboration 
- DST design: EU law violations 
(nationality discrimination – 
fundamental freedoms principles, 
state aid doctrine) 
- Double taxation 
- Turnover tax: no regard to 
profitability, customers’ economic 
incidence 
- Privacy related issues 
- Unclear “sunset clause” 
- Unilateral provision triggering a 
trade war 
Italian politicians increasingly frustrated at being unable to legally tax digital multinationals, 
through their DST deliberately decided to put pressure on the OECD work to find a solution as 
soon as possible. Covid-19 has increased the interest for DSTs even more because taxing digital 
companies is a great way to raise additional revenues from businesses outside our country to 
fund national post-pandemic economic recovery. 
Italy is hoping to reach a solution at the OECD level by the end of 2020. But without a general 
agreement Italy will collect digital taxes in 2021. 
Changing international tax rules is not an easy task and in my opinion it will require much time. 
Several other countries, in the meantime, have decided to move quickly ahead with unilateral 
measures to tax the digital economy postponing the effects of their taxes to the 2021. 
On 12 June 2020, in response to these trends, U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin sent a 
letter to the finance ministers in the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Spain sustaining that 
the work of the OECD Inclusive Framework had reached an “impasse”, and that the U.S. was 
withdrawing from collaborative negotiations on the international tax system reform.157 
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United States are not accepting the OECD approach that is leading to the introduction of 
unilateral and interim measures that probably will hit U.S. technology companies. Mnuchin’s 
letter is expressing the American’s willingness to postpone or hinder the digital taxation issue, 
in these days, “a time when governments around the world should focus their attention on 
dealing with the economic issues resulting from COVID-19”.158 
This U.S. decision could potentially generate an escalating trade war and provide multinationals 
with vast new uncertainty over their future tax bills. 
In fact, it is well known that the United States has threatened to impose tariffs on European 
imports in response to European DSTs that they interpreted to work as tariffs on American 
products. 
The U.S. opened a 301 investigation (a precursor to tariff threats) into digital services tax 
policies proposed by: Austria, Brazil, the Czech Republic, the EU, France, India, Indonesia, 
Italy, Spain, Turkey and the UK. In December 2019 they released a report sustaining that those 
taxes discriminate against U.S. companies. The U.S. then for example, publicly threatened 
France with tariffs of up to 100% on some French exports.159 
A conflict with Europe appear inevitable as the finance ministers of France, Italy, Spain and the 
United Kingdom wrote a joint letter reacting to the U.S. “provocation” on June 17.160 They 
sustained that digital giants will emerge from the current crisis more powerful and more 
profitable, that reaching a consensus-based solution is more crucial than ever now and that 
postponing and not addressing these challenges would constitute a collective failure.161 They 
confirmed that either they will reach an international agreement also with U.S. by the end of 
2020 or they will apply their national tax. 
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3.4 RPA-I: an interesting proposal for the future 
OCED Pillar One has the aim of quantifying the return attributable to marketing intangibles / 
distribution functions and of reallocating taxing rights on that profit to market countries. 
The issue here, is whether or not consider the market countries as source country. An additional 
step therefore would be identifying the user himself as a source of profit. Under this perspective 
consumers would be a nice point of reference as they are relatively immobile in a territory. 
They could represent a new nexus criteria and this view could offer an interesting opportunity 
to tax profits generated by any companies in any territory in which they have no physical 
presence but a huge market. 
The Oxford International Tax Group, founded by Michael Devereux, developed the Residual 
Profit Allocation by Income (RPA-I)162, a proposal dealing with the taxation of profit in the 
location of consumers. It is representing a radical shift form the past because it consider users 
of digital services as a source of profit. However, it was my concern to ask myself how to 
respond to the great changes of the last twenty years and this proposal from the UK seems to 
me very interesting and the best way to pursue a long-term tax reform. 
RPA-I distinguishes between routine profits that are attached, under the existing tax rules 
(Transfer Pricing), to countries where functions and activities take place and residual profit that 
get allocated on a destination basis where sales are made to third parties (new nexus rule). 
The residual profit of a multinational can be calculated in two ways: 
• by calculating the residual gross income (RGI) realized in each destination country 
(bottom-up approach); 
• by subtracting the total routine profit from the Group’s total profit, the residual profit 
obtained is then attributed directly by RGI. 
It essentially would “brings significant advantages; it would not affect the location of economic 
activity, it would remove tax competition, it could be considerably less complex and much less 
prone to profit shifting”.163 
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I sustain this proposal because: it is in line with the OECD Pillar One profit split approach ; it 
is respecting concepts and mechanisms employed by the existing system; it also pursue a simple 






It is well understandable and reasonable that gaps and problems related to international taxation 
law are no longer bearable from a political point of view. 
In particular, tax definition of PE together with the notion of what constitutes a taxable presence 
in a country did not keep up with rapid changes in the world. 
One significant result has turned out to be that digital companies are not paying their fair share 
of taxes by taking advantage of their digitalised business models.  
Large digital multinationals like Google, Amazon, Facebook and Apple represent the emblem 
of companies not paying significant amount of tax in jurisdictions where they nevertheless hold 
a sizable market name and many customers. But also many other sectors’ processes and 
activities are fully digitalised. 
However, a tax ring-fencing companies exclusively operating in the digital sector does not seem 
to be eventually viable. 
A radical reform of the entire international tax system is therefore needed. 
* * * * * 
The tax community should concentrate on general principles rather than on sector-specific 
taxes. 
Such an ambitious challenge deserves multilateral approach, the sole capable to render an 
actionable, practical and consistent tax reform. Moreover, broad and convinced international 
consensus is required. 
The OECD and the Inclusive Framework look like to be the appropriate places to discuss 
solutions and projects as well as to promote agreement on the same. So far tax experts and 
different broader stakeholders groups working together have produced relevant results. 
To the contrary, unilateral measures (like the Italian DST) are to prove inappropriate for at least 
three reasons: 
- first, almost all taxpayers shall legally oppose such measures claiming that they fall 
outside the scope of existing bilateral tax treaties, involve numerous EU law violations 
(nationality discrimination, fundamental freedoms principles, state aid doctrine) and lead 




- second, it is simplistic and short-sighted adopting unilateral measures while most people 
in many countries are now definitively convinced about the necessity to stabilize the 
entire international tax system according to the new 21st century ways of doing business; 
- third, unilateral digital taxes would impose trade barriers to cross-border digital trade and 
a tariffs war has to be expected, mainly if the U.S. put in practice their threats for 
retaliation. 
* * * * * 
It has also to be considered that Covid-19 health crisis has determined a very bad year for global 
economy. In July, the EU’s 27 governments empowered the European Commission to rise €750 
billion of debt. The plan is to start repaying the money from 2027. The European Commission 
is proposing to create a new recovery instrument, the Next Generation EU. Cooperation in the 
field of taxation is needed to support this programme. 
A potential disrupting commercial clash between Europe and the U.S. (the former adopting 
unilateral digital taxes and the latter overreacting) would only undermine economic recovery if 
not worsening it. 
Such foolish international rush towards erecting barriers to trade in response to supposed 
harmful tax policy should be abandoned in favour of on long term growth shared policies. 
It would be good if OECD gathered a “minimal consensus” on Pillar One by the end of 2020 
in order to avoid other unilateral actions, while Pillar Two goes improving. 
The challenge is getting countries to agree on how much profit should be reallocated to market 
jurisdictions and under what principles. 
To such extent, the OECD is inclining versus shifting profit from one jurisdiction to another 
based on clear and reasonable principles that are still under discussion. On profit allocation 
rules, researchers and data analysts are showing how the compensation for tax revenue lost to 
avoidance is quite small for developing countries. 
Let's say that a “minimal consensus” on the Unified Approach would represents a successful 
outcome considered the difficult political environment and the complexities involved. 
Consensus on Pillar Two is instead much harder to be obtained because the OECD GloBE 
Proposal is suggesting both source-based (undertaxed payments rule ) and residence-based 
(income inclusion rule) taxation but it still lacks international agreement on which states and in 




a larger effect on tax revenues. For developing countries the adoption of the undertaxed 
payments rule would be preferable as they have more inbound than outbound investments. 
Additionally, it should be agreed upon the appropriate minimum corporate tax rate and be 
understood how the GloBE Proposal will coexist with “GILTI” (Global Intangible Low-Taxed 
Income) regime and the “BEAT” (Base Erosion and Anti-Abuse Tax) introduced by the U.S. 
in December 2017. 
Globally each year, multinationals are shifting 40% of corporate profits to tax heaves for more 
than $600 billion. This practice reduces corporate income tax revenues by more than $200 
billion annually. 
The combined effect of both OECD’s pillars would generate around $100 billion per year, 4% 
of global Corporate Income Tax. MNEs headquartered in investment hubs (tax havens like 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Mauritius, Netherlands, and Singapore with inward investment above 
150% of GDP) should be mostly affected under this proposal. 
Italy, instead, through its Digital Services Tax, is expecting to gain €708 million each year. 
All these numbers are part of preliminary economic analyses and impact assessments and they 
have been largely criticized. 
It should also be recalled that the OECD is presenting a proposal with untested complexities 
that may create administrative challenges and an inevitable increase in compliance costs. 
Countries will have to free up enough resources to develop capacities to deal with these new 
rules. That will be problematic especially for developing countries. 
* * * * * 
OECD is strongly determined in achieving a solution, because it staked an enormous amount 
of its institutional reputation on being the only body that can deliver a consensus based solution. 
Nevertheless present contingency remains extremely delicate under the following respects: 
● the pressure of time suffers from the lack of a shared “Plan B”; 
● lots of technical articulated guiding principles still have to be procured in order to finally 
prevent worldwide proliferation of digital taxes; 





● additionally, the U.S. will no more accept any kind of sectorial discrimination against 
their national companies and they will not sit at the OECD negotiating table if the 
Inclusive Framework will not discuss wider scope solutions. 
● meanwhile taxpayers are worried and ask for more certainty and details on a project that 
will hit their profits and that since now has been really unstable; 
● countries are suffering budgetary shortfalls due to Covid-19 crisis, so that they are fully 
concentrated on their own economic recovery and they are ready to collect taxes in 2021 
through the already implemented DSTs. 
It exists an high risk that the OCED November 2020 proposal will not meet stakeholders’ needs 
and expectations for technical details on significant choices, definitions, compromises and 
assumptions. 
OECD has promised clarification and is now undergoing public scrutiny. 
* * * * * 
In the near term the OECD Pillar infrastructure should better be worked on, even if it seems to 
be already moving towards the right direction. Notwithstanding, in the long term more incisive 
changes should be introduced in response to the radical transformation of the economy due to 
the digital revolution. 
In other words, in the future the good work brought on by OECD under Pillar One could be 
well integrated with proposals involving the allocation of all residual profit on a destination 
basis. 
The Residual Profit Allocation by Income (RPA-I) might represent a practical solution and a 
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